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 Great innovations seldom come from a single individual or firm.  Rather, entire 
networks of people, usually sponsored by many firms drive great innovation, innovation 
that is rarely captured in a single product or service, but an entire platform sponsored by 
an ecosystem of firms.  Many of these innovative platforms are guided by a visible hand, 
coalitions of firms that coordinate and collaborate.  One such “visible hand” is the 
multipartner alliance, a collection of tens, hundreds, or even thousands of firms 
assembled to collaboratively define, develop, and promote innovation.  While much 
research in collaborative innovation assumes homogenously available benefits and an 
exogenously determined appropriation of these benefits, this dissertation assumes 
heterogeneity and explores the degree to which benefits may be endogenously 
determined.  The benefit of interest is a firm’s own innovation productivity based on 
technologies defined by the multipartner alliance.  In studying firm actions, choices, and 
characteristics as they relate to participating in multipartner alliances, I examine the 
relationships between a firm’s innovation productivity and its entry timing, value-chain 
position, level of membership, contribution, timing of contribution, and size.  These are 
tested primarily using hierarchical negative binomial regression and an original dataset 
developed in cooperation with the Bluetooth Special Interest Group, a multipartner 
alliance of over 12,000 firms interested in defining, developing, and promoting short 
range wireless technology.  Empirical findings suggest support of heterogeneity in the 
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Collaborative innovation is responsible for invention, development, and 
exploitation of many of the world’s great information technologies from the internet to 
wireless connectivity to smart energy.  These innovations that require substantial 
“interrelated changes in product design, supplier management, information technology, 
and so on” (Chesbrough & Teece, 1998:3) frequently go well beyond the boundaries of a 
single firm and may require the innovation efforts of tens, hundreds, or even thousands of 
firms.  The market’s invisible hand often shapes the ongoing efforts of firms creating and 
capturing economic value from these innovations.  However, hybrid forms of 
organizations often surface to satisfy the complementary needs of technology or to aid in 
the winnowing efforts of the industry to achieve a dominant design.  One hybrid form, 
multipartner alliances, may be created to more formally coordinate the collaborative 
innovation activities of an entire value chain or ecosystem.  This coordination effort 
strives to standardize, economize, facilitate, and/or accelerate using collaboration.  
Frequently, the goals of the collaboration are to build a large economic base from the 
innovation and create opportunities for member firms to appropriate the benefits of 
participation, particularly when collaboration turns to competition (Dyer, Singh, & Kale, 
2008; Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Lavie, 2007; Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008).  
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Research in standards, firm networks, and alliances has shed much light on the 
benefits, opportunities, and challenges associated with multipartner alliances such as 
standard-setting organizations (SSOs), R&D consortia, and industry networks.  However, 
these benefits, opportunities, and challenges are often assigned to the collective or 
assumed to be homogeneously available or distributed across the membership of the 
collective as observed by Lavie, Lechner, and Singh (2007).  This research refutes this 
assumption and works from the premise that there is significant heterogeneity in the 
availability of many of these benefits and while some appropriation of benefits is 
exogenously determined, some appropriation is endogenously determined through firm 
choice and managing alliance dynamics. As recently highlighted by Chesbrough (2009), 
Teece (1986) asked the question why do some firms profit from their innovation 
invesments and others do not?  Teece then proceeded to describe a variety of exogenous 
influences to appropriability including the nature of knowledge, the intellectual property 
rights related to that knowledge, and the nature of complementary assets required to 
exploit innovations in the market.  Supporting an endogenous view of capturing some 
value from innovation, Chesbrough (2009) then raised the point that firms that own or 
have access to these complementary assets may profit from innovation activities, even 
within weak appropriability regimes.  Within the setting of multipartner alliances, I 
extend the endogeneity argument to include the impact of a firm’s entry timing, value 
chain position, membership level, contribution to the collective, firm size, and timing of 
contribution on the innovation productivity of the firm. 
 In Chapter 2, the relationship between alliance entry timing and firm innovation 
productivity is examined.  While the traditional definition of first-mover status relies on 
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market entry (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), this work explores the dynamics of 
coordinated innovation years before market entry and the entry timing decisions of other 
firms who enter an industry years after first products were offered.  Prior research 
hypothesized and validated a positive U-shaped relationship between multipartner 
alliance entry timing and firm innovation productivity suggesting that it was beneficial to 
the firm to be early or late, but less beneficial to enter in the middle (Lavie, Lechner, & 
Singh, 2007).  In this chapter, I introduce the importance of value chain position in this 
relationship by hypothesizing that a firm with a primary focus on products defined by the 
specifications of the alliance (standard products) may experience significant early entrant 
disadvantages attributed to technological and organizational inertia.  Late entrants 
pursuing standard products may also experience significant disadvantages due to scale 
economies that benefit firms pursing standard products.  For firms focused on 
complementary products, I hypothesize that these firms will exhibit the same entry 
timing/innovation productivity relationship found by Lavie et al. (2007) leveraging 
traditional theory of early- and late-entrant advantages.  Empirical testing suggests 
general support for these hypotheses. 
 While entrance into a multipartner alliance reflects initial intent by management, 
research suggests that firms enjoy greater benefits of membership from increased levels 
of involvement.  These increased benefits may be from increased network embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985), superior access to tacit knowledge (Grant, 1996; Uzzi, 1997) control 
of alliance decision processes and agendas (Dutton, 1995; Saxton, 1997), exerting 
influence on the alliance by occupying leadership positions (Rosenkopf, Metiu, & 
George, 2001), or the exploitation of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough, 
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Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006) .  Prior research has examined network position and 
membership level (with specific focus on multipartner alliance board members) (Lavie et 
al., 2007) as proxies for involvement.  In Chapter 3, not only do I analyze the relationship 
between innovation productivity and membership level (a previously used proxy for 
network position, access to tacit knowledge, influence and control), but I also extend 
research on a fundamental question of open innovation – the relationship between 
purposive outflows or spillovers of knowledge to the collective and firm-specific 
innovation productivity.  While mechanisms related to intellectual property rights and use 
of complementary assets typically drive appropriation discussions in open innovation, I 
highlight two additional mechanisms (alignment and absorption) that may be particularly 
useful in large multipartner alliance settings with particularly weak appropriability 
regimes.   From the perspective of the firm, I empirically examine these mechanisms by 
breaking down total contribution into dimensions of breadth and depth of contribution 
and assessing their influence on the innovation productivity of the firm.  Results not only 
confirm the expected advantages to contributing firms, but provide a rare, large-scale 
empirical analysis of open innovation and mechanisms related to alignment and 
absorption. 
 Technology-focused multipartner alliances can be characterized by a dual 
innovation process (West, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 2006).  Not only do member 
firms actively collaborate (particularly in early stage development) to produce 
requirement documents, specifications, and strategic plans for exploiting core 
technologies, but individual firms also strive for firm-level, product differentiating 
innovations.  This dual innovation process leads to an interesting 
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competitive/collaborative dynamic that may also influence firm innovation productivity 
by extending additional benefits to firms that actively contribute during early stage 
developments of the core technologies.   
During the early-stage, intensely collaborative phase of the alliance, firm leaders 
may rely less on traditional sources of competitive advantage for positioning their firms 
for dual innovation, and more on sources of collaborative advantage such as flexibility, 
social capital, and willingness to share unique knowledge with the collective (Dhanaraj & 
Parkhe, 2006; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Resource deficient new 
ventures that actively leverage these sources of collaborative advantage may thrive in an 
environment where future competitive positioning may be dependent on this early-stage 
collaborative positioning (Agarwal, Audretsch, & Sarkar, 2007; Gilbert, McDougall, & 
Audretsch, 2008). 
In Chapter 4, I explore the relationship between active participation and firm 
innovation productivity moderated by the maturity phase of the alliance (collaborative vs. 
competitive) and firm size.  While theories attributed to liabilities of smallness/newness 
and absorptive capacity may suggest an initial innovation productivity gap between less 
and more endowed firms that grows larger with increased participation (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Deeds, 2001), I hypothesize that actively participating new firms can 
leverage early-stage collaborative positioning to narrow the innovation productivity gap 
between less and more endowed firms.  Empirical results suggest little impact of 
contribution timing to innovation productivity and small firms at a deficit do not close the 
gap with increased levels of contribution.  Surprisingly from at least the initial 




collaborative phase of specification development experience significant innovation 
productivity disadvantages.  This leads to a discussion highlighting appropriation patterns 
of relational rents within the multipartner alliance that may be discouraging to altruistic 
small firms yet favorable to those firms that subscribe to leveraging accumulated 
resources and capabilities while protecting against the hazards of transacting within the 
multipartner alliance. 
In Chapter 5, I conclude with a summary of findings from this dissertation, 
highlights contributions that should increase understanding of the heterogeneity in 






TIMING OF ENTRY IN MULTIPARTNER ALLIANCES 
Competing and complementing firms increasingly form multipartner alliances to 
define, standardize, develop, and market new technology under a framework of rules 
striving for cooperation and benefit sharing. Forms of these multipartner alliances include 
standard-setting organizations (SSO), industry networks, R&D consortia, and supplier 
networks. Examples from technology-driven industries include the 300+ member Wi-Fi 
Alliance, the 800+ member USB Forum, the 950+ member GSMWorld, and the 12,000+ 
member Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG). Research in this area often extends from 
alliance and multiple dyadic alliance networks research (Gulati, 1998; Powell, 1990; 
Uzzi, 1997), which highlights benefits (e.g., relational rents, enhanced trust, improved 
innovation) that networks offer to alliance partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, Nohria, 
& Zaheer, 2000; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996).  However, while much research 
assumes that benefits are homogenously available to all partners, emerging research has 
demonstrated that the availability and distribution of benefits are diverse among partners 
(Lavie et al., 2007).  
  Lavie et al. (2007) analyzed differential benefits to the partners of the Wi-Fi 
Alliance (a coalition of firms focused on wireless networking technologies) based on 
timing of entry and level of involvement. Arguing that differential benefits could be 
attributed to early-mover and late-entry advantages (Lambkin, 1988; Lieberman & 
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Montgomery, 1988, 1998) and path dependence (Gulati, 1995), they conjectured and 
validated a U-shaped curvilinear relationship between a firm’s timing of entry into a 
multipartner alliance and its benefits from affiliation with the alliance, specifically what I 
refer to as the firm’s innovation productivity. This suggests that enhanced innovation 
productivity may accrue to early-movers and late-entrants in technology alliances such as 
the Wi-Fi alliance.  However, considering the complex technologies like Wi-Fi that 
require an entire ecosystem of providers to innovate, develop, and bring the technologies 
to market, I questioned whether both early-mover and late-entry benefits are available to 
all links in the value chain represented by the membership of the multipartner alliance.   
There is both a temporal order to and temporal variance in the development of 
complex technologies.  Development tools, demonstration platforms, hardware and 
software components, subsystems, and end product are rarely developed simultaneously.  
Each often represents a building block for links downstream in the value chain.  
Simultaneous innovation in the value chain is constrained by required antecedents and 
outcomes that limit the speed of system-wide innovation (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996; 
van Hoek, 1998).  More specifically, there may be a distinction between firms that 
primarily focus on standard technology defined by the alliance and those firms that 
position themselves as complementary technology providers.  Standard technology 
providers may be more subject to the timing and development processes of the 
standardization effort, their own ability to revisit their product’s system architecture to 
deal with alliance-defined revisions, and the operating rules defined by alliance 
governance.  Complementary technology providers may be more dependent on their own 
innovation capabilities and less dependent on the specifics of the standard technology due 
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to modular, “black box” design techniques (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996).  These 
influences suggest that product focus or value chain position may alter the findings of 
Lavie et al. (2007). 
Extending the work of Lavie et al. (2007), I examine the overall relationship 
between a firm’s innovation productivity and its timing of entry into the alliance, but 
demonstrate in this chapter that adherence to an early-mover or late-entry strategy for at 
least one link in the value chain of a multipartner alliance ecosystem may be an inferior 
innovation productivity strategy.  The reduction in design control and potential need to 
return to the architecture design to satisfy requirements of new versions of the standard 
may limit early-mover advantages (Henderson & Clark, 1990) to those firms developing 
emerging standard technology.   Many multipartner alliances aim to carefully specify and 
subsequently standardize certain parts of the final technical solution to improve 
interoperability, testability, and manufacturability.  The links in the value chain 
developing standardized product may face rapid commoditization and hence, learning-
curve and economies of scale advantages may also limit late entrant options (West, 
2005). 
I evaluated the relationship between a firm’s innovation productivity and the 
firms alliance entry timing using a database from the Bluetooth Special Interest Group 
(SIG), currently a multipartner alliance with more than 12,000 member firms focused on 
short-range wireless solutions for the communication, computer, consumer, and 
automotive industries.  Formed in 1998, this alliance represents members responsible for 
shipping nearly one billion Bluetooth-enabled phones, wireless headsets, computer 
peripherals, and gaming devices in 2009.  Comprising three levels of membership, 
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alliance governance is a shared activity between the member firms that constitute the 
promoter level (currently Ericsson AB, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and 
Toshiba) and a privately held, not-for-profit trade association responsible for publishing 
Bluetooth specifications, administering the qualification program, protecting the 
Bluetooth trademark and evangelizing Bluetooth technology (www.bluetooth.com).  
Technical committees in the Bluetooth SIG specify the standard technology that 
primarily defines the wireless communications hardware and software components of the 
system solution that ensure both interoperability and application-specific functionality.   
This study contributes to alliance research by examining partner productivity 
differences in multipartner alliances that are attributed to value chain position and timing 
of entry.  While the analysis confirms the overall U-shaped curvilinear relationship 
between productivity and entry timing identified by Lavie et al. (2007) using a different 
technology-focused multipartner alliance, it also challenges the generality of that finding 
in important ways.  This study reveals, empirically, differences in the relationship 
between productivity and timing of entry when considering different parts of the value 
chain represented by the alliance.  This not only suggests implications for firm-specific 
entry strategies and need for firm-level dynamic capabilities, but also implications for 
appropriate alliance governance to support member firms that may benefit from different 
entry strategies.   
Theory and Hypotheses 
As system design complexity increases in emerging technologies, firms have 
discovered that the combined system, hardware, software, and marketing requirements 
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are often beyond the capabilities and capacities of the individual firm.  Reaching beyond 
the borders of the firm through joint ventures, contractual relationships, and strategic 
alliances to solve this issue is common practice and extensively researched (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Kotabe & Swan, 1995; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Williamson, 1985), but 
some of the world’s major technological innovations that touch the lives of hundreds of 
millions or even billions of people may require the collaboration and coordination of an 
entire ecosystem of firms.  Large, broad-based, multipartner alliances have emerged to 
develop and standardize new technologies, drive rapid global acceptance, and in many 
cases literally create new product markets in industries such as mobile communication, 
smart energy, computing, and consumer multimedia.   
Launching from alliance and multiple dyadic alliance networks research (Gulati, 
1998; Powell et al., 1996; Uzzi, 1997), multipartner alliance research has explored 
motivation for formation and governance mechanisms (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Mitchell, 
Dussauge, & Garrette, 2002), and value of cooperative R&D (Sakakibara, 2001).  The 
research also involves standardization of technologies, including both alliance-level 
issues such as standards development, adoption, organization, overall economic welfare, 
processes, and impediments (David & Greenstein, 1990; Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1988; 
Sakakibara, 2003; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Wade, 1995), and firm-level issues such 
as firm choice between standards and network development, information, and marketing 
advantages of participation (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, & Bruderer, 1995; 
Rosenkopf, Metiu, & George, 2001). With this solid foundation established, one branch 
of research in multipartner alliances has started to explore a central question of strategy: 
differences in benefits appropriated by individual participating firms.  Potential sources 
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of private benefits may be related to size of alliance network, relative partner size and 
their network configuration, and informal ties to dominant partners (Dyer et al., 2008; 
Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Lazzarini, 2007).  Lavie et al. (2007) explored whether 
partners enjoy differential benefits and what factors explain some of the distribution of 
benefits among partners.  They found that there are differential benefits and factors such 
as timing of entry, level of participation, and external involvement all contribute to these 
differential benefits.   
The theory behind the U-shaped curvilinear relationship between timing of entry 
and innovation productivity (Lavie et al., 2007) was developed based on early-mover and 
late entry advantages (Lambkin, 1988; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Shankar, 
Carpenter, & Krishnamurthi, 1998) that are traditionally applied to market entry, but 
applied in this case to multipartner alliance entry, often a precursor to market entry.  
Lavie et al. (2007) suggested early mover advantages could be attributed to influencing 
the evolution of multipartner alliances, forming and utilizing governance mechanisms in 
these alliances, and extending the lead time for innovations and product applications.  
Late entry advantages, often ascribed to firms pursuing the exploitation phase of a 
product market life cycle, include avoiding set-up investments, significant R&D and 
market education costs, selecting the alliance more successful at achieving the dominant 
design, and facilitating the use of accumulated alliance knowledge while focusing on 
commercialization (Shankar et al., 1998). 
Early-mover and late-entry advantages may hold for many firms participating in 
multipartner alliances, but there may be strong, countering influences for some firms 
which could be attributed to their principal product offering and value chain position.  
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More specifically, firms producing the products focused on the standard technology 
defined by the alliance may experience different temporal challenges than those firms 
producing complementary products and services.   
The different outcomes for early-mover, standard technology providers may be 
attributed to issues identified in Henderson and Clark’s (1990) seminal article on 
architectural innovation.  The process of achieving a standardized definition of the 
fundamental technology in the multipartner alliance (Farrell & Saloner, 1985, 1988) may 
be likened to the process of achieving a dominant design (Suarez & Utterback, 1995).  As 
the alliance releases a ratified version of standard technologies, firms cease to invest or at 
least reduce investment in learning about alternative configurations (Henderson & Clark, 
1990) and advance the product design focused on that version of the standard technology.  
Unfortunately, for many technology-focused multipartner alliances that attempt to define 
standard technology products, feedback from product developers, testing houses, and the 
general market often drive the development of improved versions of the standard before a 
mass-produced, mass-marketable, and consumer-desired product is offered.  At a lower 
level of abstraction than that discussed in Henderson and Clark (1990), the different 
versions of the standard technology may force engineering teams to return to the system 
architecture implementation.  While the individual components of the architecture may be 
similar, the less-obvious linkages in these components may vary causing a need to return 
to a redesign of the system architecture.  Should new architectural knowledge be 
required, those firms that invested heavily in prior versions may be handicapped in their 
attempts to switch to a new mode of learning and invest time and resources into a new 
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architecture. This handicap may cause those firms pursuing products centered on the 
standard technology to enjoy fewer early-mover advantages.  
While producers of complementary products may continue to enjoy product and 
service differentiation opportunities late in the technology life cycle (Lavie et al., 2007), 
producers of standard technology products face commoditization challenges.  A frequent 
output of the multipartner alliance is a documented standard that firms use to produce 
similar technology giving consumers vendor choice and often interoperability for those 
products designed to the standard.  The dynamics of this part of the ecosystem frequently 
drive firms to pursue cost leadership strategies with economies of scale and learning 
curve advantages determining the long-term success of firms (West, 2005).  This 
commoditization of the standard technology may lead to a deterioration of late-entry 
advantages for those firms primarily pursuing the standard technology.   
Lavie et al. (2007) hypothesized and found a U-shaped curvilinear relationship 
between timing of entry and productivity for members of the Wi-Fi Alliance.  They 
argued that early-mover and late-entry advantages were instrumental in describing why 
this relationship was found.  Leveraging the same case, I hypothesize a similar 
relationship between entry timing and innovation productivity in larger multipartner 
alliances when examining aggregate membership.   
Hypothesis 1:  Timing of entry is curvilinearly related to firm innovation 
productivity with early and late entrants experiencing greater innovation 
productivity than intermediate entry. 
 
 This study also analyzes segments of the value chain often represented by the 
membership of technology-focused multipartner alliances.  To successfully define, 
produce, and subsequently market products designed using the complex technologies 
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developed by these alliances, governing bodies often strive to obtain a membership 
represented by all related links in the technology’s value chain.  For example, in mobile 
telephony, the GSM World multipartner alliance includes “750 of the world’s mobile 
operators, as well as 200 companies in the broader mobile ecosystem, including handset 
makers, software companies, equipment providers, internet companies, and media and 
entertainment organizations” (www.gsmworld.com).   
 Considering the value chain diversity of membership in these technology-focused 
multipartner alliances, the positive U-shaped curvilinear relationship examined in 
Hypothesis 1 may not apply to all links in the value chain.  A key distinction explored in 
this paper is between firms principally producing products designed specifically to the 
alliance technology standards versus firms principally producing complementary 
products and technology.  As highlighted earlier, those firms that principally focus on the 
standard technology may face challenges when alternating between component and 
architectural design due to technical changes that are exogenously redefined by the 
collaborative innovation efforts of the alliance.  The inability of some firms producing 
standard technology to transition between architectural and component level design 
through the revisions (as predicted by Henderson & Clark’s (1990) architectural 
innovation theory) may reduce early-mover advantages for firms pursuing the standard 
technology.  Firms pursuing complementary products often modularize or “black box” 
the standard technology.  This may enable less dependence on exogenously influenced 
changes to standard technology and more control over the system architecture of their 
own products.  This reduced dependence and increased control may require fewer revisits 
to the complementary product system architecture and thus enable greater early-mover 
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advantages as firms can focus on product differentiation.  Additionally, commoditization 
of standard technology may reduce advantages of late entry that are available to 
complementing firms that have more flexibility to differentiate.  These effects lead to 
hypotheses that examine different timing-of-entry versus productivity relationships in the 
various links in a value chain represented by a multipartner alliance. 
Hypothesis 2a: For firms principally focused on complementary products, timing 
of entry is curvilinearly related to firm innovation productivity with early and late 
entrants experiencing greater innovation productivity than intermediate entry. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: For firms principally focused on standard products, timing of 
entry is inversely curvilinearly related to firm innovation productivity with early 
and late entrants experiencing smaller innovation productivity than intermediate 
entry. 
 
Data and Methods 
 The Bluetooth SIG, Inc. is a nonprofit trade association supporting the activities 
of over 12,000 member firms representing the full ecosystem supporting Bluetooth 
technology, a short-range wireless technology used in a variety of applications including 
cell-phones, wireless headsets, and personal computer peripherals.  Organized in 1998, 
the Bluetooth SIG represents an excellent setting for this research.  First, the Bluetooth 
SIG formed technical committees to specify much of the software and hardware 
component technology that enables wireless networking and interoperability.  Additional 
technical and marketing committees describe application-specific features to enable a 
common platform for subsystem and end product differentiation.  Second, multipartner 
alliance governance is a shared activity between the Promoter firms and the 
professionally managed trade association.  This governance structure aims to provide 
balance between the needs of the Promoters and the Associate and Adopter levels of 
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membership while striving to provide an equitable foundation for members to compete.  
Third, as one of the largest technically-focused, multipartner alliances in history, the 
extensiveness of this alliance not only enabled empirical analysis of membership, time of 
entry, and product qualification, but also a detailed exploration of the different links in 
the Bluetooth value chain. 
 By 1996, several firms looking to standardize a low-cost, short-range wireless 
technology to unite computing and telecommunication devices started discussing 
collaboration.  Intel had a program called Business-RF, Ericsson’s program was called 
MC-Link, and Nokia had a program called Low Power RF.  Discussions and technical 
work continued through 1998 when Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia, and Toshiba put their 
weight behind a new technology and marketing initiative called Bluetooth, named after 
the tenth century Scandinavian King Harald Bluetooth who was famous for uniting 
Scandinavia.  By 2000, 3Com, Lucent, Microsoft and Motorola had joined the promoter 
group and over 1200 firms had joined the Bluetooth SIG in one of three levels of 
membership: Promoter, Associate, or Adopter.  Version 1.0 of the standard had been 
released and component providers were actively trying to develop and qualify product.  
In these early days with rapid vendor adoption, Bluetooth’s hype may have driven 
immature technology to market and subsequent customer confusion. The technology 
suffered from a lack of interoperability, or the process which allows products from 
various manufacturers to work together, and a lack of customer experience with 
“connecting” wireless technology (Bluetooth technology requires pairing, or the process 
of securely connecting two devices).  Version 1.0b was released in December 1999 to 
correct some of the early errata. Version 1.1, released in November 2000 to provide 
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authentication and repair errors found in version 1.0b, arguably became the first 
successful operating version of Bluetooth technology, facilitating the rapid growth in 
membership and qualified product.  Providing backward compatibility, version 1.2 was 
released in November 2003 to improve connection speed, transmission rate, and improve 
voice quality and market adoption expanded rapidly after the release of version 1.2.  
Version 2.0 was released in November 2004 to boost data rate and improve power 
consumption.  Version 2.1 was released in July 2007 to improve security and pairing.  
Versions 3.0 and 4.0 representing alternative communication technologies were released 
in 2009. 
 This study analyzes firm entry and date of product qualification through June of 
2008 for firms entering the alliance by November of 2007.  Commencing in 2000, firm 
entry is determined by the “clickwrap” or member creation date.  The clickwrap date is 
when a member accepted the electronic contract available on the web.  While there were 
approximately 2,000 members prior to the institution of this method of electronic 
agreement, these prior members were subsequently required to reestablish the electronic 
agreement with the Bluetooth SIG.  By November 2007 (the end of this study), 
membership had grown to over 9700 firms with rapid growth experienced in 2006 and 
2007 (Figure 2.1).  In analyzing recent growth, much of the rapid membership growth 
can be attributed to firms from China, Taiwan, and other countries in southeast Asia, 
reflecting the maturity of the technology and economic trends in this part of the world. 
By November 2007, there were 5856 qualified product from 955 registered firms.  


































































































































Accumulated Number of Members in Bluetooth SIG
As identified from 2008 membership list
 
Figure 2.1.  Bluetooth membership growth 
 
 
entry dates were not available in the database for 71 firms responsible for 127 qualified 
products.  These firms and qualified product were not included in the final set consisting 
of 5729 products and 884 firms (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
Membership in the Bluetooth SIG is open to all firms with an interest in Bluetooth 
products and technology.  Three membership levels are available to partner firms.  
Promoters within the Bluetooth SIG (a group that has fluctuated between five and nine 
firms over the history of the SIG) each hold one seat and one vote on the board of 
directors and qualification review board to influence the strategic and technological 
directions of Bluetooth.  These firms make considerable investment in personnel to 






























































































































Accumulate Number of Qualified Bluetooth Product
 

































































































































Accumulated Number of Members with Qualified Product Joining 
Bluetooth SIG Through November 5, 2007
 
 





subject to approval by the board of directors.  Associate membership is open and is 
subject to an annual membership fee ranging from $7500(USD) to $35,000(USD) which 
enables early visibility into draft specifications, committee membership, limited voting 
rights, and discounted listing fees for products.  At the end of 2007, there were 273 
Associate members.  Of the 884 firms with qualified product in this database, 338 have 
been Associate members at some time during the duration of this analysis.  The vast 
majority of the membership is at the Adopter level. Adopter membership is free and these 
companies gain access to completed specifications and may use the Bluetooth 
trademarks.  There are 439 firms with qualified product included in the Adopter level of 
membership. 
The Bluetooth value chain consists of development tools and test systems, 
software and hardware components, subsystems and modules, and end product.  The 
analysis in this paper partitions the value chain into four links: Dev/Demo Kit 
(Development Tool/Demonstration Kit), HW/SW Components (Hardware and Software 
Components), Subsystems, and End Product.   In tracking and listing qualified product 
over the 7 years of this analysis, the Bluetooth SIG maintained two different sets of 
categories depending on the qualification program version.  Figure 2.4 highlights the 
grouping used in this paper to reflect the four links in the Bluetooth value chain.  
To complete the value-chain analysis in this paper, firms with qualified product 
were identified by their main product offering as determined by selecting the value chain 
category with the most products qualified from a given firm.  To capture the impact of 
firms qualifying product in more than one category, a control variable was included to 
 
 22
Version 1 Version 2 
Development Tool Value Chain Map Development Tool 
 
Figure 2.4.   Mapping of Bluetooth products by value chain position 
 
 
capture vertical integration intensity.  Figure 2.5 captures the value chain breakdown of 
the 884 firms represented in this sample.  Figure 2.6 represents the total number of 
products in each of the four links of the value chain. 
Some data used in this paper were derived from public sources including 
www.bluetooth.org, www.bluetooth.com, and individual member firm websites.  
Additional data were obtained through direct contact (phone and email) with member 
firms from October 2009 to May 2010.  I have entered into a confidential disclosure 
agreement (CDA) with the Bluetooth SIG that enabled the availability of comprehensive 
product qualification data, membership information, and private interviews.  The CDA 
allows aggregate reporting of the data while protecting the privacy interests of the 
Bluetooth SIG and their members.   
Firm entry and membership change dates were recorded by members of the 
Bluetooth SIG administration, these analysts currently headquartered in Bellevue, 
 






















































Number of Qualified Products by Position in Value Chain 
 




Washington.  Since the Adopter level of membership is free of charge, firms no longer 
participating in the benefits of paid membership are automatically moved to this level.  
As a result, exit from the multipartner alliance is not a recorded event.  Product and 
qualification data were recorded by a combination of the administration and self-
reporting member firms. 
 
Measures  
Dependent variable.  Technology-focused multipartner alliances strive to provide 
both technological and marketing benefits to complement a member firm’s own product 
development and subsequent marketing efforts.  A key measure of firm-level benefits 
from multipartner alliance participation is satisfying the testing standards for product 
certification or qualification.  Satisfactory completion of the Bluetooth Qualification 
Process provides member firms with the ability to qualify their products, obtain the 
Bluetooth intellectual property license, use the Bluetooth trademarks, and list their 
qualified products on the Bluetooth website (www.bluetooth.com). 
Consistent with the method used by Lavie et al. (2007), I measure firm innovation 
productivity as the number of products a firm has qualified through the Bluetooth 
Qualification Process by June 30, 2008, standardized by the duration of the firm’s 
membership in the Bluetooth SIG measured in years.   While nearly half (407 out of 884) 
of the firms in the sample qualified only one product during the period analyzed, 214 out 
of 884 firms qualified five or more products with one firm qualifying over 500 products.   
Independent variables.  To test the timing of entry hypotheses, I measure a 
partner’s Order_of_Entry.  A U-shaped relationship in order of entry was analyzed using 
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a squared term Order_of_Entry_Squared.  Sorting the partner’s entry as determined by 
the date recorded in the Bluetooth SIG database, I calculated order of entry and treated 
this variable as a continuous variable in the analysis.  To analyze differences that may 
exist between complementary (coded ‘1’) and standard (coded ‘0’) product focused firms, 
I constructed a dummy coded variable Std_vs_Comp.   To then test the individual links in 
the value chain and to compare the relationship between timing of entry and innovation 
productivity for standard and different forms of complementary product firms, I created 
dummy variables for Development, Subsystems, and End_Product to allow comparisons 
to the development kit classification and to provide additional explanatory power to the 
variance in performance. 
Control variables. To capture differences in productivity that may be attributable 
to level of membership, I created dummy variables for Promoter and Associate members 
with Adopters being the comparison group and representing the remaining members. 
Approximately one-fourth of the sample (219 of 884) produced product in more than one 
of the four value chain categories.  To control for innovation productivity effects that 
may be attributable to firms servicing more links in the value chain, I measure a partner’s 
integration intensity as 1 - 22 iij
j
Nk∑ , where kij is the number of products qualified by 
partner i in value chain link category j, and Ni  is the partner’s total number of qualified 
products.  High values of this measure suggest greater and more balanced levels of 
integration across the value chain.  Finally, to capture model effects that may be linked to 
firm size, I used a simple binary measure for Large_Firm to account for firms with 




the high percentage of private firms (>65%) and international firms (>76%) included in 
the database that required extensive secondary and imprecise data gathering methods. 
Analysis 
 Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics.  I used hierarchical negative binomial 
regressions to examine the effects of the control and independent variables along with 
interactions on entry timing and value chain position variables.  The negative binomial 
model, a member of a family of distributions characterized as general linear models 
(GLM), is recommended when evaluating count data with overdispersion, a case when 
the variance of the estimated count exceeds the mean.  Correcting overdispersion by 
using an ancillary parameter, the negative binomial model is appropriate when using a 
count dependent variable with an order of entry independent variable (Hilbe, 2007).  The 
expected value of the estimated number of products certified by partner i during its 
alliance membership (ti) was determined using the equation:  
iimiioii mxxxt σεββββλ ++++++= ...)log(log 2211 , where iλ  is the expected value of 
products qualified.  This model was developed using maximum-likelihood estimation in 
the GLM analysis tools of SPSS with the log of membership duration measured in years 
as the offset variable to normalize innovation productivity for time spent in the 
multipartner alliance.  Order of entry was mean-centered to reduce impact of collinearity 
between the linear and squared order of entry terms.  Testing of Hypothesis 1 was based 
on the full model (model 4 in Table 2.2). 
 To test the concept advanced in this paper that firms focused on complementary 
products would exhibit different innovation performance characteristics than firms 
 N Mean STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Innovation Productivity 885 6.47 23.83 1.000
2. Promoter 885 .01 .09 .111 1.000
3. Associate 885 .38 .49 .441 -.070 1.000
4. Integration_Intensity 885 .11 .20 .645 .130 .266 1.000
5. Large_Firm 885 .28 .45 .289 .144 .001 .230 1.000
6. Development 885 .03 .16 -.074 -.015 -.003 -.045 .099 1.000
7. Components 885 .16 .37 .130 .031 .108 .219 .034 -.073 1.000
8. Subsystems 885 .09 .29 .037 .016 -.016 .167 .066 -.053 -.138 1.000
9. End_Product 885 .72 .45 -.103 -.030 -.077 -.270 -.107 -.269 -.702 -.512 1.000
10. Std_vs_Comp 885 .84 .37 -.130 -.031 -.108 -.219 -.034 .073 -1.000 .138 .702 1.000
11. Order_of_Entry 885 1.00 255.62 -.304 -.134 -.052 -.303 -.236 -.138 -.251 .010 .249 .251 1.000
12. Order_of_Entry_Squared 885 6.53E+04 5.84E+04 -.104 .113 -.090 -.020 .020 .053 .085 .001 -.089 -.085 .007 1.000
a Table 1 reports the number of observations, means, and standard deviations of the variables and the Spearman's correlation matrix
Correlation coefficients larger than 0.065 in absolute value were significant at the 5% level.  Order_of_Entry centered before squaring.





Table 2.2.  Negative binomial regression results 
Model Model Model Model
1 2 3 4
Intercept -6.982*** -7.017*** -6.955*** -7.084***
(0.106) (0.105) (0.100) (0.111)
Promoter 1.630*** 1.513*** 1.970*** 1.766***
(0.331) (0.324) (0.317) (0.327)
Associate 1.059*** 1.031*** 1.046*** 1.081***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.069) (0.070)
Integration_Intensity 1.658*** 1.796*** 2.133*** 2.129***
(0.185) (0.189) (0.185) (0.185)
Large_Firm 0.752*** 0.782*** 0.966*** 0.966***
(0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Std_vs_Comp 0.371***
(0.0975)
Development -0.974*** -0.836*** -0.853***
(0.255) (0.249) (0.250)
Subsystems 0.069 -0.177 -0.168
(0.145) (0.142) (0.141)






Dispersion Parameter 0.70* 0.67* 0.63* 0.63*
N 885 885 885 885
Log Likelihood -2183.5 -2164.4 -2113.1 -2109.5
df 878 876 875 874
2x Delta Log Likelihood from Model 1 38.3*** 140.8*** 148.0***
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Significance levels (2-tailed):  † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 1 Order of Entry mean-centered prior to squaring to reduce collinearity issues.  
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focused on standard products, I tested a variable dummy coding each firm primarily 
focused on standard (‘1’) or complementary (‘0’) products in model 1.   Observing a 
significant different, I then analyzed dummy coded measures for each link in the value 
chain compared to component (standard) products in model 2 and found all to be 
significantly different than components.  Models 3 and 4 included a linear and squared 
order of entry term to complete analysis of Hypothesis 1.  
For model 5 in Table 2.3, I examine the linear and quadratic terms of 
Order_of_Entry independent of value chain position.  Exploring the relationship of 
innovation productivity and timing of entry further, I isolated each link in the value chain 
by analyzing the interaction of both the linear and squared order of entry terms with each 
dummy coded measure representing the four links in the value chain in models 6 through 
9 to provide greater insight into the phenomenon explored in Hypothesis 2a and 2b.  For 
this Bluetooth dataset, complementary products are best represented by models 6, 8, and 
9, while primary products are best represented by model 7. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 was tested by examining the significance and sign of the coefficients 
of the timing of entry variables (model 4).  While Lavie et al. (2007) found a negative 
and significant linear relationship between timing of entry and productivity, I found a 
positive and significant relationship ( )001.,36.1 <−= pEβ .  This can partially be 
attributed to the centering of the order of entry data.  Consistent with the findings of 




Table 2.3.   Firm innovation productivity by value chain position and order of entry 
Model Model Model Model Model
5 6 7 8 9
Intercept -6.922*** -6.920*** -6.921*** -6.921*** -6.917***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Promoter 2.069*** 1.997*** 1.967*** 2.046*** 1.828***
(0.330) (0.328) (0.331) (0.329) (0.328)
Associate 1.094*** 1.090*** 1.087*** 1.086*** 1.064***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Integration_Intensity 1.869*** 1.835*** 1.915*** 1.894*** 1.978***
(0.176) (0.175) (0.176) (0.178) (0.177)
Large_Firm 0.952*** 0.957*** 0.946*** 0.954*** 0.949***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Order_of_Entry 1.22E-3*** 1.15E-3*** 1.11E-3*** 1.18E-3*** 1.69E-3***
(1.54E-4) (1.55E-4) (1.67E-4) (1.62E-4) (2.86E-4)
Order_of_Entry_Squared 1.46E-7 3.86E-7 6.17E-7 2.78E-7 -1.96E-6*
(6.33E-7) (6.35E-7) (6.64E-7) (6.46E-7) (9.68E-7)
Order_of_Entry x 1.43E-3
  Development (2.16E-03)
Order_of_Entry_Squared x 5.58E-6
  Development (6.41E-5)
Order_of_Entry x 2.57E-4
  Components (4.43E-4)
Order_of_Entry_Squared x -2.46E-6†
  Components (1.34E-6)
Order_of_Entry x 6.90E-04
  Subsystems (4.83E-04)
Order_of_Entry_Squared x 1.98E-6
  Subsystems (1.45E-06)
Order_of_Entry x -7.83E-04*
  End_Products (3.28E-04)
Order_of_Entry_Squared x 3.20E-06**
  End_Products (9.96E-07)
Dispersion Parameter 0.65* 0.64* 0.65* 0.65* 1.178*
N 885 885 885 885 885
Log Likelihood -2122.0 -2115.3 -2118.4 -2120.1 -2109.8
df 877 875 875 875 875
2x Delta Log Likelihood 123.1*** 136.4*** 130.2*** 126.9*** 147.4***
from Model 1
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 Significance levels (2-tailed):  † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 1 Order of Entry mean-centered prior to squaring to reduce collinearity issues.  
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between the squared term of entry timing and innovation productivity 
( 01.,671.1 <−= pE )β , suggesting support for Hypothesis 1. 
 Hypothesis 2a was tested by examining the significance and sign of the 
coefficients for the timing of entry variables first in model 1  and then separately in 
models 6, 8, and 9.  Model 1 demonstrates a significant difference in innovation 
productivity between firms coded as standard product focused firms (Components) and 
complementary product focused firms (all others) by examining the Std_vs_Comp 
variable ( 001.,371.0 <= p )β .  Extending the analysis to each link in the value chain, the 
interaction of order of entry and the dummy coded links were independently evaluated.  
With only 24 firms with a primary product focus in demonstration and development kits 
(model 6), no significant relationship was found between timing of entry and innovation 
productivity for this early stage in the value chain.  No additional variance is significantly 
explained by the interaction of model 8 for Subsystems.  Model 9 highlights the impact 
End_Product has on the overall model showing significant negative linear 
( 05.,0483. <− pE )7−=β  and positive curvilinear ( )01.,062.3 <−= pEβ  relationships 
between Innovation_Productivity and Order_of_Entry.  These results suggest support for 
Hypothesis 2a and explain the importance of end products to the overall relationship. 
 Hypothesis 2b was tested by examining the results of model 7 which accounted 
for hardware and software components, the primary output of the standardization efforts 
of the Bluetooth SIG.  A positive significant relationship was found on the mean-centered 
linear Order_of_Entry  term ( 001.,311.1 )<−−= pEβ . As hypothesized, an inverse U-
shaped relationship is observed as demonstrated by the negative and significant beta term 
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of the interaction between Components and Order_of_Entry_Squared 
( 1.,646.2 <−−= pE )β .  While the linear term on Order_of_Entry dominates, a 
moderate negative curvilinear relationship suggests empirical support for Hypothesis 2b.  
Of particular interest to the arguments of this research, all links in the value chain do not 
exhibit the U-shaped curvilinear results highlighted in prior research (Lavie et al., 2007). 
 The results of model 4 suggest significant differences between each of the links in 
the value chain representing complementing products and the omitted comparison of 
Components.  Development ( )001.,853.0 <−= pβ  was negatively associated and end 
product ( .,325.0 <= p )001β  was positively associated with innovation productivity 
while Subsystems did not exhibit significant differences from the control.  Innovation 
productivity of Promoters ( )001.,766.1 <= pβ , and Associates ( )001.,081.1 <= pβ , 
vary significantly from Adopters in all models. Integration intensity is also positively 
associated with innovation productivity ( )001.,129.2 <= pβ , a strong effect that 
remained significant throughout the models suggesting that firms with balanced offerings 
across multiple links in the value chain increased innovation productivity.   
Discussion and Conclusion  
 This study extends the work of Lavie et al. (2007) where they explored the 
heterogeneity of benefits among partners in a multipartner alliance.  Beyond confirming 
their aggregate finding of a positive U-shaped curvilinear relationship between timing of 
entry into the multipartner alliance and productivity using a different technology-focused 
alliance, this study extends this work by analyzing the entry timing versus innovation 
productivity relationship between standard and complementary products and strengthened 
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that analysis by exploring the contribution of each link of the value chain in the timing of 
entry and innovation productivity relationship. The key finding is that while end product 
firms primarily focused on complementary products exhibit a U-shaped relationship 
between innovation productivity and timing of entry, those firms focused on standard 
products exhibit a weak inverse U-shaped relationship with a strong positive linear 
element to order of entry, contradicting the relationship advanced by Lavie et al. (2007).  
Additionally, greater insight was obtained by examining the relationship for all links in 
the value chain.  Results show that firms focused on end products enjoy benefits of early 
and late entry as demonstrated by the significant positive U-shaped relationship, but no 
other link in the value chain experienced the relationship discovered by Lavie et al. 
(2007) potentially bringing into question the early-mover and late-entry advantages 
advanced in that study.  The positive relationship between the linear term of 
Order_of_Entry and the dependent variable potentially suggest additional advantages to 
later entry. 
 The theory leveraged and advanced in this paper suggests differences in the entry 
timing versus innovation productivity relationship based on if a firm’s primary offering is 
focused on the standard technology defined by the multipartner alliance.  Some 
differences may be attributed to architectural innovation issues of transitioning between 
system architecture and component design due to exogenous signals.  Firms desiring 
early-mover advantages to outweigh the disadvantages may need increased emphasis on 
developing dynamic capabilities and competence to readily move between system 
architecture and component design in times of technological change (Teece, Pisano, & 
Schuen, 1997).  More specifically, to improve the likelihood of meeting the architectural 
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challenges required to satisfy multiple versions of a standard, organizations could 
develop a capability in top-down, hierarchical design.  Fundamentally, top-down, 
hierarchical design provides a level of abstraction, a methodology, and tools for each 
level of design to enable more seamless interactions between the various levels of design, 
improve overall design verification, and facilitate rapid correction of design issues at all 
levels of the design.  For a general review and background on top-down, hierarchical 
design used in hardware and software design and a discussion of the advantages 
described above, see Chang et al. (1999).  As a form of a dynamic capability, leveraging 
this methodology in product development eases the pain new versions of standards, 
market feedback, design-for-manufacturing needs, or even internally driven errata 
introduces to the product innovation process, thus potentially reducing some early-mover 
disadvantages attributable to the challenges of multiple transitions between component 
and architectural level design.  
 The findings of this study contribute to emerging research on differential benefits 
available to members of multipartner alliances by examining temporal aspects of firm 
participation decisions.  Prior research highlights a general relationship between 
productivity and timing of entry (Lavie et al., 2007), exploration versus exploitation 
opportunities based on alliance entry timing (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), and general 
advantages of early mover and late entry (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998; 
Makadok, 1998; Shankar et al., 1998) into markets.  I contribute to this area of research 
by examining firm-level innovation productivity differences attributed to timing of entry 
and value chain position in multipartner alliances. 
 
 35
 My findings suggest at least two key implications.  First, firms developing 
standard technology products face an interesting strategic dilemma when choosing 
between traditional early-mover benefits which include learning curve advantages, 
favorable market positions, and network establishment and the potential architectural 
change and path dependence pitfalls described in this study.  To successfully compete as 
an early entrant, my findings hint at the importance of creating dynamic capabilities in 
engineering to overcome architectural changes required by the alliance (Teece, Pisano, & 
Schuen, 1997). 
 The second key implication challenges the governance of the multipartner alliance 
(Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002).  Much of the organizational structure, the 
interorganizational processes, and the rules of interaction and engagement are established 
by the founding and early-stage partners of the alliance to establish the social, economic, 
and technical order that enables collaborative innovation.  If, as this research suggests, 
there are early-mover disadvantages for at least one link in the value chain represented by 
the alliance, this group of firms may be underrepresented or misrepresented in the early-
stage governance-formation activities of the alliance since key stakeholders may choose 
to delay participation.  This suggests a need for flexibility or even the development of 
dynamic capabilities by the governing body of the multipartner alliance.  Of equally 
significant importance is the notion that the group of firms experiencing the inverse U-
shaped relationship between timing of entry and productivity is the same group of firms 
that should be heavily involved in defining the standard technology of the alliance.  This 
further implies that many of the firms striving for early-mover advantages in the standard 
technology are often instrumental in the definition of the standard, yet may not reap the 
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benefits attributed to standard definition, suggesting a potential disconnect between the 
inventers of the standard and the innovators of the technology (Chesbrough, 2003).  
While firms need to develop dynamic capabilities to combat the issues of architectural 
change for their own products, the governing bodies of these multipartner alliances also 
need to develop their own dynamic capabilities to adequately manage the complexities of 
the value chain represented by the alliance. 
 This Bluetooth database includes details from firms that represent the full 
spectrum in firm size, organizational structure, headquarters location, and product focus.  
No single major geographic area has a majority representation within the alliance 
reflecting a tremendously diverse membership.  Approximately 72% of the 885 firms in 
this sample are privately held.  In spite of heroic data collection efforts relying on both 
primary and secondary sources, emailed interviews, and assistance from the Bluetooth 
SIG, detailed knowledge about a firm’s activities prior to the alliance, ancillary 
innovation efforts, alliance portfolios, participation in other multipartner alliances, and 
internal emphasis of Bluetooth are essentially unknown.  Each of these factors could 
contribute to unexplained variance in the existing model. 
 Little is known about the comparable market success, economic impact, and level 
of innovativeness of individual products.  Details such as where a product was developed, 
complexity of the innovation, and how long it took to produce are also unknown.  Greater 
knowledge of each of the 5700+ products could enrich the analysis and provide greater 
insight into both the innovativeness and the performance of the firm related to the 
technologies of the multipartner alliance.  However, the dependent variable of choice 
throughout this dissertation (Firm Innovation Productivity) captures not only a firm’s 
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ability to leverage the collaboratively developed innovations of the multipartner alliance 
for their own benefit, but increasing numbers of new qualified products also reflect to an 
extent a firm’s economic performance from their own innovation productivity. 
 Considering the ecosystems perspective briefly highlighted in this chapter (more 
discussion on value networks later in Chapter 3), there is little knowledge of how a firm’s 
products contribute to the overall success of the Bluetooth ecosystem.  Some firms may 
contribute greatly to the success of the overall technology.  For example, Cambridge 
Silicon Radio reported in 2005 and 2006 annual reports that a majority of all Bluetooth 
qualified end products used their integrated circuits.  Others may simply contribute 
through network effects as each new product released raises the awareness and legitimacy 
of the technology. 
 Lastly, as is the case with numerous studies of this nature (including the reference 
study by Lavie et al. (2007)), these hypotheses were tested using data from a single 
multipartner alliance drawing concerns of external validity.  However, the simple 
replication study from Hypothesis 1 highlights the effort to increase our understanding of 
multipartner alliances by crossing alliance boundaries.  Additionally, as will be shared in 
Chapter 5, preliminary work is underway to examine how strategic choices within 
multiple multipartner alliances may alter the benefits participating firms may enjoy. 
While this study extends the study by Lavie et al. (2007), as noted above, more 
research is needed to generalize the findings for other industries, alliance configurations, 
and governance structures.  The boundary conditions of this study may be defined by 
each of these areas.  First, the Bluetooth SIG was formed to “create a market” for short-
range wireless communication between computing, consumer, and communication 
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devices.  Members of this multipartner alliance faced significant technological and 
market uncertainty for at least the first five years of existence.  Future research could 
examine benefits attributed to order of entry and value chain position in settings facing 
much less uncertainty, perhaps in markets where uncertainty is not determined by the 
question of “if” the technology would be adopted, but rather, “which one.” 
 Second, the Bluetooth SIG exhibits several characteristics that differentiate it 
from many of the alliance configurations that receive much attention in the literature.  
Borrowing language from wireless networking vocabulary, many of the technology-
focused multipartner alliances tend to have a “mesh” network configuration as opposed to 
a “star” network configuration.  A star network is defined as a central hub and spoke 
configuration with a powerful, decision-making central-node with ancillary nodes tied 
primarily to the hub.   The automotive maker/supplier and pharmaceutical 
distributor/innovator networks are excellent examples of star networks.  Alternatively, the 
mesh network configuration has distributed monitoring and control responsibilities with 
the potential for some clustering and a significant number of ties between many 
participants (hence the moniker “mesh”).  Multipartner alliances, including the Bluetooth 
SIG, typically have open membership with diversified control and opportunities to 
influence by many members.  Benefits attributed to timing of entry and value chain 
position may differ in alternative network configurations and closed membership. 
 Third, governance structure varies across multipartner alliances.  While the 
Bluetooth SIG uses a semidemocratic combination of a governing board consisting of 
large sponsoring partners, multiple layers of membership, and professional management, 




association, or a full democracy that may improve or degrade the social order necessary 
to execute the objectives of the alliance.  These alternative governance structures may 
change the innovation opportunities of member firms. 
Lastly, in the expanding exploration of heterogeneity of benefits in multipartner 
alliances, new venture creation is an instrumental and understudied aspect of these 
alliances.  Understanding the role new ventures play in multipartner alliances could 
contribute to not only their impact on the alliance, but also an understanding of the 
entrepreneurial challenges of differentiating in highly competitive ecosystems built on the 
principle of establishing commonality.  Participating new ventures are studied in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
Beyond the guidance this study provides to firms developing participation 
strategies in multipartner alliances, this study also advances the research on heterogeneity 
of benefits to partners.  Considering the number of substantial and complex innovations 
that are being developed and marketed by the collaborative efforts of large multipartner 
alliances, advancing the understanding of firm strategies designed to maximize 
appropriation and improve alliance governance represents an important agenda for 




CONTRIBUTION STRATEGIES IN MULTIPARTNER ALLIANCES 
 In Chapter 2, the early-stage participation decisions of when to join and where to 
focus in the value chain were examined with respect to the firm’s innovation 
productivity.  Once a member, participation decisions expand to include levels of 
membership and contribution to the multipartner alliance.  The direction, resources, and 
capabilities of a member firm are rarely aligned with the direction and collaboratively 
created resources and capabilities of the alliance.  A firm will often select a membership 
level and how it contributes to the multipartner alliance to narrow this gap.  Two key 
mechanisms for narrowing the gap are advanced in this chapter.  First, a firm may 
actively attempt to influence the direction and knowledge-pool of the alliance through 
purposive outflows of knowledge to align with existing capabilities and resources of the 
firm.  On the other side of the gap, a firm may leverage these employee-contributors to 
learn and absorb collectively generated tacit knowledge and latent information that is not 
captured in codified specifications developed within the alliance (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Zahra & George, 2002). 
Research has found that increased levels of involvement in networks such as 
multipartner alliances have been linked to increased benefits from membership.  These 
increased benefits have been attributed to greater embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; 
Ibarra, 1993), superior access to tacit knowledge (Grant, 1996), control of alliance 
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decision processes and agendas (Rosenkopf et al., 2001), influence on the alliance 
through leadership (Uzzi, 1997), or the exploitation of open innovation (Chesbrough, 
2003; Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006).  The work in this chapter is built upon 
the open innovation paradigm initially labeled and defined by Chesbrough (2003) and 
advanced by an expanding collection of scholars (Almirall & Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; 
Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Henkel, 2006; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Vanhaverbeke, 2006; 
Waguespack & Fleming, 2009; West, 2006).  I extend open innovation research in two 
ways.  First, this chapter joins the sparse large-scale empirical work in open innovation 
by testing a fundamental question of open innovation – the relationship between 
purposive outflows or spillovers of knowledge and appropriated firm benefits.  While 
appropriation of benefits has frequently been tied to tight appropriability regimes relying 
on strong intellectual property (IP) protection (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Dahlander & 
Gann, 2010; Teece, 1986; West, 2007), this research explores this fundamental question 
inside a weak appropriability regime where members of multipartner alliances work 
within the framework of a royalty-free IP agreement.  Second, while IP and 
complementary assets have frequently been described as mechanisms enabling 
appropriation (Chesbrough, 2009; Teece, 1986; West, 2006, 2007), this study advocates 
that the less-formal, gap-narrowing mechanisms of aligning and absorbing can 
significantly influence benefit appropriation, particularly in weak appropriability regimes.   
Prior research has examined network position and membership level (with 
specific focus on multipartner alliance board members) (Lavie et al., 2007) as proxies for 
involvement.  These are not direct measures of involvement and contribution but only 
reflect the opportunity for involvement.  While opportunity for involvement is also 
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assessed in this chapter, I explore the impact of direct, purposive contributions to the 
alliance’s standard specifications on a firm’s innovation productivity.  Empirical results 
defend the benefits of active involvement and contribution while providing support to 
appropriation mechanisms of alignment and absorption. 
 Theory and Hypotheses 
 Following the decision to join a multipartner alliance, a firm makes strategic 
decisions regarding its level of involvement in the alliance.  These decisions may include 
selection of membership level, quantity and method of knowledge contribution to the 
collective, and how to appropriate benefits from membership (particularly for this study, 
the benefit of increased firm innovation).  A cost-benefit tradeoff exists between costs 
attributed to active contribution to the collective and the opportunity to appropriate 
innovation benefits from involvement in the multipartner alliance.  Far greater than actual 
cost of participation which may be attributed to member dues and participation expenses, 
contributing firms incur direct costs in dedicated personnel, management attention, and 
operational costs tied to the development and production of technology or products 
related to the alliance.  Indirect costs related to unintentional spillovers, opportunity costs 
of participation, and delays attributed to consensus seeking add complexity to the 
tradeoff.  On the surface, cost-economizing theory (Williamson, 1985) may suggest that 
actively contributing firms may destroy firm value without proper isolating and 
appropriation mechanisms.  Additionally, resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) may argue that free movement of firm knowledge and capabilities 
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beyond the borders of the firm hurts competitive advantage through reduced rarity and 
ease of imitation.   
On the other side of the cost-benefit tradeoff, considerable research has examined 
the benefits of collaboration and found that firms can enhance their own innovation 
through contributions to the collective.  These innovation improvements have been linked 
to the absorptive capacity of the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985), opportunities for better dyadic alliances (Rosenkopf et al., 2001), 
improved ties with other firms (Ahuja, 2000), greater discernment of tacit knowledge 
(Grant, 1996), or through an exploitation of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; West, 
2005; West & Gallagher, 2006).  As noted in the introduction, this chapter builds upon 
open innovation in that increased levels of active contribution to the alliance (purposive 
outflows) can be positively related to the innovation productivity of the firm.  However, 
the key to a favorable outcome for the firm may be in managing how to actively 
contribute to the alliance in spite of abundant free-riding opportunities, a weak 
appropriability regime, and need for complementary assets (Chesbrough, 2003; Teece, 
1986; West, 2006).    
Open Innovation has been defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows 
of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use 
of innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough et al., 2006).  While accessing and using 
external innovation and knowledge have been highlighted in various research for decades 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Zahra & George, 2002), Chesbrough 
(2006) outlines key differences including the balance between internal and external 
innovation, use of external innovation as central to the business model, enabling others to 
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exploit internal innovation, and the assumption that useful knowledge is widely 
distributed and generally of high quality. 
Firms using external innovation as central to the business model may rely on 
external knowledge sourcing from suppliers, customers, alliance partners, and even 
competitors to increase a company’s innovativeness (Laursen & Salter, 2006).  This has 
recently been labeled the “outside-in process” as compared to the “inside-out process” 
where externalizing firm knowledge and innovation is instrumental to firm success 
(Enkel, Gassmann, & Chesbrough, 2009).  More germane to this study is the “coupled 
process” (Enkel et al., 2009) that combines both processes to jointly develop and 
commercialize innovation, and specifically complex innovations that require an 
ecosystem or value network to successfully define, develop, and market the innovation. 
While the concept of position within a linear value chain was used in Chapter 2 to 
illustrate moderating effects on the relationship between entry timing and innovation 
productivity, the value network adds dimensions of complexity.  Within a value network, 
not only are complementors and competitors added to the traditional value chain of 
suppliers and customers, but a nested architectural hierarchy suggests parallel value 
networks pursuing different levels of the overall system architecture (Christensen & 
Rosenbloom, 1995).  For example mobile handset, network, and service providers form a 
value chain to bring mobile telephony to the consumer.  Within standards bodies such as 
those focusing on GSM technology, competing and complementing firms collaborate to 
develop standards for interoperability.  Dropping down a level in the nested hierarchy, 
semiconductor and software firms ensure components are available to the value chain to 
meet the standards.  Moving up a level, governments and standards organizations such as 
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ANSI (American National Standards Institute) and ETSI (European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute) help regulate and ensure compatible standards.  This is an example of 
a value network with nested hierarchy.  It also highlights the complexity associated with 
coordinating innovation within and appropriating value from value networks structured as 
multipartner alliances.  
Within some multipartner alliances that rely on member contributions to formally 
define technology, intellectual property pools (Rysman & Simcoe, 2008; Simcoe, 2006) 
may be used to determine innovation value and appropriation patterns for contributors.  
In weak appropriability regimes, complementary assets and selective release of firm 
know-how often dominate appropriation patterns (Chesbrough, 2009; West, 2007).  In 
this work, I make a case for two additional mechanisms, alignment and absorption, that 
may be used in collaborative value network settings such as multipartner alliances to 
influence appropriation from open innovation.  Alignment is the intentional effort of a 
firm to shift the direction of the alliance to more closely align with the firm.  Absorption 
is the assimilation and use of collaboratively generated knowledge to shift the direction 
of the firm to more closely align with the alliance.  This is a reflection of the coupled 
process described earlier (Enkel et al., 2009).  Considering a probable misalignment or 
gap between the direction, resources and capabilities of the alliance compared to those of 
the firm at the time of entry, the mechanisms of alignment and absorption may be used by 
a firm to narrow this gap.  The mechanisms represent endogenous attempts at influencing 
the direction of or extracting knowledge from the multipartner alliance for the benefit of 
the firm.   
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In identifying mechanisms of appropriation, Teece (1986) was particularly 
interested in how profits or rents accrue to the innovator.  In this study, I take an 
intermediate step towards appropriation of economic rents by exploring the mechanisms 
that influence how a firm uses collaboratively developed innovation to enhance the firm’s 
own innovation productivity or the rate at which a firm develops new products that rely 
on the collaborative innovation.  While the link to economic profits is not direct, it is also 
not distant as high levels of sustained innovation productivity suggest that a firm has 
likely captured sufficient value from the technology to maintain and increase the product 
portfolio.  The link becomes more ambiguous for low levels of innovation productivity 
suggesting that a firm may have successfully made the intermediate step towards 
appropriation of economic rents, but for a variety of reasons (many of which may have 
been associated with the firm’s failure to appropriate profit), innovation productivity was 
not sustained. 
In large scale multipartner alliances where no single firm provides the 
technological and strategic leadership for the alliance, direction is often determined 
through consensus and formal voting processes among influential members of the 
alliance.  Less formal means of providing direction and establishing the resources and 
capabilities of the alliance may be found in the working committees of the alliance as 
participating members advance alternative approaches and use conflict resolution 
processes to hone in on preferred directions and technologies (Rosenkopf et al., 2001).  
The direction, resources, and capabilities of a contributing firm are rarely aligned with 
those of the alliance creating the aforementioned gap.  An objective for some contributing 
firms may then be to influence the direction, resources, and capabilities of the alliance to 
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more closely align with those of the firm.  Alignment may be attempted by occupying 
leadership positions within the alliance, creation of dyadic alliances within the 
multipartner alliance to consolidate influence, accelerated external market leadership in 
the technology of interest, or active contribution to internal technical and market 
specifications (Ahuja, 2000; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf et al., 2001; 
Schilling, 2002; Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  I focus on contribution in the form of 
purposive outflows as an alignment mechanism arguing that an individual firm can 
influence collaborative efforts through active contribution. 
With diffused leadership and participation, the mechanism of alignment will 
rarely fully close the gap between alliance and firm direction.  Adapting a firm’s 
direction to the collaboratively developed direction, resources, and capabilities will likely 
be required.  Adaptation relies heavily on the concept of absorptive capacity initially set 
forth by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and reconceptualized by Zahra and George (2002) 
requiring firms to use knowledge learned from external sources.  The mechanism of 
absorption enables firms to understand not only the codified information that is found in 
the specifications developed by the alliance, but also gain valuable insight into tacit 
knowledge and latent information concerning the technology that is shared exclusively by 
those individuals actively contributing to specification development (Agarwal et al., 
2007; Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  This insight that can only be gained by actively 
contributing alliance members may provide a significant innovation productivity 
advantage to a firm striving to narrow the direction, resource, and capability gap between 
the alliance and itself. 
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Prior research examined level of involvement in multipartner alliances as 
determined by board membership status (Lavie et al., 2007).  While board members 
enjoyed positive effects on market success and exposure, board membership was 
negatively related to innovation productivity.  Level of membership in multipartner 
alliances is not a direct measure of involvement, but rather a measure of opportunity for 
involvement and contribution.  While greater opportunity (and usually greater 
expectations) comes from higher levels of membership, considerable variance in 
involvement and contribution may persist due to the different agendas pursued by 
members at these levels.  In spite of this variance and the finding of Lavie et al. (2007), I 
assert that greater opportunity for involvement and contribution will lead to enhanced 
firm innovation through sustained commitment and the mechanism of alignment, a 
benefit of “higher” levels of membership.  In many multipartner alliances, higher levels 
of membership provide greater opportunities to influence the technical and market 
direction of the technology through committee participation, voting rights, and 
internal/external promotion of the technology.  This opportunity to align the direction, 
resources, and capabilities of the alliance with those of the firm may positively influence 
a firm’s own innovation productivity.  Creating a virtuous cycle, greater levels of 
innovation productivity invite a sustained commitment to the technology and the alliance.  
Paying membership dues, fulfilling participation expectations, and assigning a firm’s 
technical- and management-focused employees to the activities of the alliance reflect 
commitment expected of higher levels of membership.  This commitment to the alliance 
and opportunity for alignment should result in a positive impact on a firm’s innovation 
productivity.   
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H1 – Increased opportunity for involvement in a multipartner alliance is 
positively related to firm innovation productivity. 
 
 While membership level may describe opportunities for involvement, it does not 
examine the direct involvement of participating members.  Actively involved members 
contribute to the development of specifications, provide leadership in the various 
committees and working groups, and assist in creating the evolving culture of the alliance 
through attendance and involvement (Rosenkopf et al., 2001).  Of particular interest in 
this study is a detailed examination of contribution to technical specifications that are 
used by the alliance to create standardized technology and the relationship this 
contribution may have with a firm’s own innovation efforts. 
 Firms that choose to actively contribute with other firms to the development of 
specifications may enjoy at least two benefits that enhance a firm’s own innovative 
efforts compared to those firms that do not contribute.  First, while a primary purpose of 
the specification development effort is to codify collective knowledge and reduce it to 
information, studies have shown and interviews with participants in this effort have 
suggested that some knowledge required to successfully implement a specified 
technology remains tacit or uncodified and thereby, exclusively shared and potentially 
absorbed by those firms involved (Agarwal et al., 2007; Ahuja, 2000; Schilling & Phelps, 
2007).  Second, a firm contributing to specification development may bring unique 
resources or knowledge to the collaboration that aligns specifications with firm-specific 
capabilities, resources, and knowledge.  This alignment may contribute to reduced 
innovation risk for the contributing firm and accelerate innovation productivity.  Based 
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on these benefits of active contribution, I hypothesize that contributing firms will enjoy 
greater innovation productivity than noncontributing firms. 
H2 – Contributing firms have greater firm innovation productivity than non-
contributing firms. 
 
Once a firm chooses to contribute to specification development, other strategic 
collaboration choices remain.  These include how to contribute, how much knowledge to 
share, when, and what to contribute to the collective.  Here, I examine how a firm 
contributes and the relationship between different proxies for contribution and innovation 
productivity.  In Chapter 4, I explore the innovation productivity differences that are 
related to the timing of a firm’s contribution. 
Chesbrough (2003) suggests an innovation paradigm shift is occurring in some 
industries where firms appropriate benefits from innovations that may originate inside of 
the firm but are exploited by others (purposive outflows) or originate elsewhere and are 
exploited by the focal firm (purposive inflows).  The multipartner alliance setting 
presents a small twist to the open innovation paradigm in that purposive outflows by 
multiple firms partially contribute to innovation but also requires the collaborative efforts 
of the contributors to complete usable specifications.  Purposive inflows reflect a firm’s 
ability to absorb and use (Zahra & George, 2002) the collaboratively developed 
innovations. This highlights once again the mechanisms of alignment and absorption used 
to close the gap between the direction, resources, and capabilities of the firm and those of 
the alliance.   
Two dimensions of contribution are proposed and tested in this chapter.  While 
both mechanisms of alignment and absorption may be at work simultaneously, I argue 
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that each dimension represents a more dominant mechanism.  Along the first dimension, 
labeled breadth, a firm chooses the number of participants it involves in the alliance 
processes.  For this study, I focus on the process of specification development.  When a 
firm’s employee has made a sufficient contribution to be recognized by committee 
leadership, she is acknowledged as a co-author of the specification.  Contribution comes 
in various forms from architectural, component, application or implementation 
knowledge-sharing to coordination to errata resolution to prototyping.  This active 
involvement by an author provides ample opportunity to not only contribute, but also to 
absorb the tacit and/or uncodified latent knowledge created within the collaboration.  
Absorptive capacity is frequently operationalized by R&D intensity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990) or other measures reflective of the quantity of people invested in creating and 
absorbing knowledge.  When multiple people are involved, a key element of absorptive 
capacity is the creation, maintenance, and broadening of a common knowledge base from 
which to absorb tacit knowledge (Reagans & McEvily, 2003) and the ability to broaden 
that common knowledge base through diversity of expertise (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
Therefore, I hypothesize that the more employees a firm has that contributes to the 
specification development in a multipartner alliance, the greater breadth of knowledge a 
firm will have to not only establish a common knowledge base, but also more diversity of 
expertise to leverage in firm innovations related to the technology of the alliance.  
H3a – Increased breadth of knowledge contribution to a multipartner alliance is 
positively related to firm innovation productivity. 
 
The second dimension captures the depth of involvement a firm can have in 
technology developed by the multipartner alliance.  Considering the hierarchical and 
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dependent nature of specifications development to innovate the complex technologies 
developed by technology-focused multipartner alliances, a firm may choose to contribute 
to more specifications to more closely align the direction of the alliance with that of the 
firm.  While this is done through purposive outflows of knowledge from the firm to the 
alliance in striving to align technical specifications with technical capabilities of the firm, 
other devices are also at work.  For example, a firm contributing to many specificaitons 
will likely have employees that create a deeper network within the multipartner alliance 
(due to the extended influential reach) and assume brokerage positions (Burt, 1992; Burt, 
2004) from the connections made while working with various contributors across 
multiple specifications.  These ties may also result in greater network centrality to both 
align firm and alliance objectives and enhance innovativeness (Bell, 2005).  Additionally, 
contributing to a greater number of specifications deepens not only the component 
knowledge described by individual specifications, but increases the influence a firm can 
have on the technology’s system architecture defined across the hierarchy of 
specifications.  Considering the alignment opportunities through outflowing knowledge 
contribution, network positioning, and influencing higher-level architectural issues, I 
hypothesize that increased depth of knowledge contribution through increasing number of 
specifications is positively related to firm innovation.  
H3b – Increased depth of knowledge contribution to a multipartner alliance is 
positively related to firm innovation productivity. 
 
While depth and breadth of knowledge are subsets of total knowledge 
contribution (and are likely highly correlated with total knowledge contribution), the 
effects of total knowledge contribution on firm innovation productivity may extend 
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beyond the technological alignment, knowledge absorption, system architectural, and 
network positioning arguments detailed above.  Depth and breadth examine contribution 
on single dimensions and while total contribution reflects a multidimensional view of 
contribution, it is not simply multiplicative of breadth and depth dimensions.  Not only 
does total contribution reflect the most comprehensive measure of a firm’s purposive 
outflows, but it also highlights the balance (or intentional imbalance) a firm may strive to 
achieve between breadth and depth.  Thus, I argue that a firm’s total contribution portrays 
both tactical and strategic measures of alliance contribution.  I hypothesize that total 
knowledge contribution is also positively related to firm innovation productivity.  
H3c – Increased total knowledge contribution to a multipartner alliance is 
positively related to firm innovation productivity. 
 
Data and Methods 
 The empirical analysis in this chapter also uses the Bluetooth SIG, a large, 
international multipartner alliance focused on the ongoing development of short-range 
wireless technology.  As noted in Chapter 2, members of the SIG have joined at one of 
three different levels of membership (Promoter, Associate, or Adopter) with some 
flexibility to change membership level throughout their membership (e.g., new Promoters 
must be invited by the other Promoter firms, Adopters must pay annual member fees to 
move to Associate membership, etc.).  Each level provides varying degrees of 
involvement opportunity through observation, specification development, leadership, and 
voting.  While membership level has been used as a proxy for involvement in prior 
research (Lavie et al., 2007), this measure only reflects the opportunity for involvement 
and is not necessarily a direct measure of involvement. 
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 Throughout the history of the Bluetooth SIG (to the end of 2009), there have been 
over 100 specifications or subspecifications adopted by the governing board of the SIG.  
There were 553 unique authors from 106 different firms who participated in the 
development of these specifications.  Authorship is achieved through various means 
including original contribution, significant editing, errata contributions, or concept 
validation.  Unlike other consortia such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
(Waguespack & Fleming, 2009) or IEEE where specifications are typically developed 
and sponsored by a firm or individuals to then be scrutinized, enhanced, and voted upon 
by fellow committee members, any individual from a Bluetooth member firm may gain 
authorship through active contribution to the specification development as determined by 
committee leadership.  By examining actual authorship of each specification, it is 
possible to explore the breadth, depth, and total contribution of knowledge by the 106 
actively participating firms. 
 I examine a firm’s qualification of new products as the measure of innovation 
productivity.  To normalize for time involved in the SIG, I also normalize the innovation 
productivity measure for total duration of membership.  As of November 2007, 5856 
products have been qualified by 884 different firms.  From the 106 firms that actively 





Dependent variable.  The dependent variable (Firm Innovation Productivity) is 
measured as the number of new products a firm has qualified to the Bluetooth standard.  
Only firms that have qualified at least one product in the firm’s history are included in the 
dataset. To account for varying lengths of membership by contributing firms, a variable 
offset was included in the model to capture the number of years the firm was a member 
of the alliance. 
Independent variables.  To capture membership level and considering some firms 
have occupied multiple levels of membership throughout the history of the Bluetooth 
SIG, I dummy code each firm based on the highest level of membership achieved: 
Promoters (board members), Associates (active members with paid membership), and 
Adopters (passive members with free membership).  To differentiate between active and 
passive participants (Contributor), each firm from the set of firms that qualified at least 
one product is coded a “1” if the firm had an employee as a contributing author to any 
specification, and a “0” if the firm did not employ any contributing authors to any 
specifications.  
Considering the breadth and depth of knowledge that may be possessed by 
employees from contributing firms, I measure a firm’s knowledge contribution along two 
dimensions. Breadth of knowledge is measured as the number of Total_Unique_Authors 
employed by a firm who contributed to any specification, suggesting greater 
opportunities for absorption with greater numbers of people involved.  Depth of 
knowledge is captured as the number of unique Total_Specifications authored by 
employees of the firm, suggesting deeper involvement in hierarchical specification 
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development and network positioning.  A third measure of contribution, 
Total_Contribution, is coded for each firm as the cumulative number of times all authors 
from a firm received authorship acknowledgement in all specifications. 
Control variables. Considering the limitations of working with a large database 
consisting of firms extensively international and private, a simplified coding scheme was 
used to capture effects related to firm size.  For Hypotheses 1 and 2, Large_Firm was 
coded a “1” for those firms determined to have greater than $300M USD in 2009 
revenues and/or greater than 1,000 employees as determined through public records, 
email interviews, and information available through company websites and press 
releases.  The variable was coded a “0” otherwise.  Additionally, Order_of_Entry 
remains in the model to capture variance attributed to timing of entry which is the order 
of entry as determined by the date a firm joined the Bluetooth SIG.  The first entering 
firm was coded “1,” the next firm a “2” and so forth.   
For Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c, improved access to data (primarily through the 
Bluetooth SIG) for firms that actively contributed to specification development enabled 
the use of additional control variables that may explain variance in the innovation 
productivity measure for firms actively contributing to the multipartner alliance.  To 
account for failed (Failed Firm) or acquired firms (Acquired firms) that may reflect an 
earlier-than-expected end to innovation productivity, two dichotomous measures are 
included to capture effects related to these exits (coded “1” if failed or acquired, a “0” 
otherwise).  Considering that only alliance members with either Promoter membership or 
Associate membership are entitled to contribute to the specification development process, 
I draw distinction between these two levels of membership with the dichotomous 
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measure Promoter to capture effects related to membership level (Promoters are coded a 
“1”, Associates a “0”).  Membership duration measured in days is captured as an offset 
variable in the dependent variable.  Firm size is captured in the measure Small_Firm 
which was coded a “1” for those firms determined to have revenues less than $300M 
USD in 2009 and/or less than 1,000 employees.    
Analysis  
 Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.1 for the analysis of Hypotheses 1 
and 2 and in Table 3.3 for the analysis of Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c.  Hierarchical 
negative binomial regressions using the SPSS 17.0 GLM module were used to account 
for the skewed distribution and overdispersion caused by the dependent variable’s count 
data.  As in Chapter 2, the dependent variable Innovation_Productivity is normalized for 
time using a log of the number of days each firm has been a member of the Bluetooth 
SIG.  Hypothesis 1 was evaluated using Model 1 from Table 3.2 to understand the 
innovative productivity gains Promoter and Associate members have compared to the  
 
Table 3.1.   Descriptive statistics – all qualifying members 
N Mean STD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Innovation_Productivity 885 6.47 23.83 1.000
2. Large_Firm 885 .28 .45 0.289 1.000
3. Order_of_Entry 885 1.00 255.62 -0.304 -0.236 1.000
4. Promoter 885 .01 .09 0.111 0.144 -0.134 1.000
5. Associate 885 .38 .49 0.441 0.001 -0.052 -0.070 1.000
6. Contributor 885 .08 .27 0.299 0.253 -0.178 0.259 0.230 1.000
Table 3.1 reports the number of observations, means and standard deviations of the study's
variables and the Spearman's correlations.  Correlation coefficients larger than 0.065 in





















Dispersion Parameter 0.74* 0.72*
N 885 885
Log Likelihood -2181.0 -2171.4
df 879 878
2x Delta Log Likelihood from Model 1 19.2***
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Significance levels (2-tailed): * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001  
 
contrast group of Adopters. A positive and significant beta coefficient on these dummy 
coded measures would suggest support for Hypothesis 1.  Hypothesis 2 was examined 
using Model 2 in Table 3.2 to determine the innovation productivity benefits when 
comparing product-producing firms that contribute to specification development and 
those that do not. 
 Descriptive statistics related to the contribution hypotheses are captured in Table 
3.3.  Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c were evaluated using models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 3.4.  
Due to the highly correlated measures of depth, breadth, and total contribution, each
 N Mean STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Innovation_Productivity 106 22.27 43.03 1.000
2. Promoter 106 .08 .27 0.244 1.000
3. Acquired 106 .15 .36 -0.250 -0.120 1.000
4. Failed 106 .03 .17 -0.157 -0.049 0.087 1.000
5. Small_Firm 106 .44 .50 -0.472 -0.255 0.207 0.191 1.000
6. Total_Unique_Authors 106 5.22 9.83 0.431 0.468 -0.038 -0.016 -0.420 1.000
7. Total_Unique_Specifications 106 9.35 14.80 0.490 0.425 0.066 -0.042 -0.379 0.706 1.000
8. Total_Contribution 106 19.00 41.28 0.471 0.426 0.026 -0.007 -0.408 0.858 0.936 1.000
Table reports the number of observations, means and standard deviations of the study’s variables
  and Spearman's correlation matrix
Correlation coefficients larger than 0.19 in absolute value were significant at the 5% level.  






Table 3.4.   Regression results for measures of contribution 
Model Model Model Model
3 4 5 6
Intercept -4.512*** -4.990*** -5.134*** -4.869***
(0.240) (0.261) (0.259) (0.254)
Promoter 0.792 -1.927† -1.240 -0.434
(0.621) (1.075) (0.847) (0.740)
Acquired -0.722 -1.175* -1.454** -1.237*
(0.496) (0.472) (0.496) (0.491)
Failed -2.307† -2.325* -2.351* -2.338*
(1.206) (1.179) (1.187) (1.193)
Small_Firm -1.577*** -1.196*** -1.026** -1.194***







Dispersion Parameter 2.61* 2.36* 2.26* 2.41*
N 106 106 106 106
Log Likelihood -364.6 -360.1 -358.4 -361.0
df 100 99 99 99
2x Delta Log Likelihood from Model 1 9.0** 12.4*** 7.2**
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels (2-tailed):  † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
DV - Firm Innovation Productivity (offset ln(DaysMember))
Only Contributing Firms Included




model independently examines the impact each type of contribution may have on a firm’s 
innovation productivity.  While this method enables the independent examination of 
different types of contribution, a comparative analysis is not meaningful. 
Results  
 To test Hypothesis 1, I examined the significance of the coefficients for the 
dummy variables Promoter and Associate that are contrasted with the lowest level of 
membership, Adopter in Model 1 of Table 3.2.  Both variables exhibited positive and 
significant relationships with the dependent variable, Innovation_Productivity  
( 001.,208.1;001.,421.2 )<=<= pp ββ .  The magnitude of the Promoter predictor 
coefficient was greater than that of Associate suggesting a possible significant difference 
between these two levels of membership.  In an alternative test contrasting Promoter and 
Adopter against Associate to verify a significant difference between Promoter and 
Associate, a positive and significant result was also obtained, suggesting increasing levels 
of innovation productivity with increasing levels of membership.  Hypothesis 1 is 
supported.  Hypothesis 2 was evaluated by examining the positive and significant 
Contributor coefficient in Model 2 ( )001.,528.0 <= pβ , suggesting that product-
producing firms that actively contribute to the creation of technical specifications enjoy 
greater innovation productivity than those that do not.  Hypothesis 2 received empirical 
support. 
 Transitioning to the dataset that includes only those firms that actively contributed 
to specification development (descriptive statistics are in Table 3.3), I examine the 
coefficients of contribution measures for each of the different forms of contribution as 
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expressed in Hypothesis 3a, 3b, and 3c.  In Model 4, the coefficient for 
Total_Unique_Authors is positive and significant ( )01.,090.0 <= pβ  indicating support 
for the hypothesis that broader participation through an increased number of unique 
authors is positively related to innovation productivity.  From Model 5, the predictor 
coefficient for Total_Specifications is positive and significant ( )01.,052 <.0= pβ  
providing support for the hypothesis that contributing to the development of an increased 
number of specifications is positively related to innovation productivity.  Finally for 
Hypothesis 3c, the coefficient for the comprehensive measure of contribution, 
Total_Contribution ( )05.,014.0 <= pβ  is also positive and significant.  Independently, 
each measure of contribution is positively and significantly related to innovation 
productivity providing multi-faceted empirical support to the open innovation argument 
that firms making intentional outflows of knowledge (even in weak appopriability 
regimes such as the Bluetooth SIG), may appropriate greater internal benefit from their 
shared knowledge and highlights multiple contribution methods that may enhance these 
benefits. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
While early work in open innovation relied heavily on case studies, small-sample 
qualitative studies, and examination of a limited number of industries such as open source 
software and high technology (Chesbrough, 2003; Gruber & Henkel, 2006; West & 
Gallagher, 2006), academic research is expanding to include recent articles and dedicated 
issues in journals such as Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management 
Journal, Research Policy, and R&D Management.  While few in number, larger-scale 
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empirical studies have emerged and are reaching beyond traditional industries including 
manufacturing (Laursen & Salter, 2006), automotive (Ili, Albers, & Miller, 2010), 
information technology (Waguespack & Fleming, 2009), and user communities (von 
Hippel, 2005).  Reviewing scholarly work from the last several quarters (including the 
June 2010 edition of R&D Management, a special edition on open innovation co-edited 
by Chesbrough), I identify at least four general themes for future research.  First, 
empirical work beyond small-scale, industry-specific studies will enhance credibility of 
open innovation as a meaningful paradigm shift.  Second (and as captured in recent work 
by dissertation committee member, Joel West), making sense of a growing innovation 
segmentation that includes open, user, cumulative, mass, and distributed innovation could 
unify the research community examining the opportunities associated with external 
innovation.  Third, while some research has examined how open innovation affects new 
ventures in open source software, extending the empirical work in different settings and 
tying open innovation to sources of new ideas and opportunities may provide insight into 
the value of open innovation in entrepreneurship.  Fourth, understanding mechanisms that 
provide a more holistic model and limitations of open innovation is needed.  The research 
of this dissertation contributes to the first (Chapter 3), third (Chapter 4), and fourth 
(Chapter 3) themes of future research. 
A key goal of this dissertation is to examine endogenously influenced decisions 
that may provide insight into the relationship between a firm’s multipartner alliance 
participation strategies and its innovation productivity.  While Chapter 2 explored 
decisions of when to become a member, this study picks up after this decision has been 
made to join and empirically examines the impact of membership level and of 
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contribution.  I also explored how certain forms of contribution may impact firm 
innovation productivity.  Multiple theories predict the positive relationship between a 
firm’s participation in network configurations such as multipartner alliances and the 
benefits the firm may gain.  However, considering the weak appropriability regime with 
Bluetooth’s royalty-free intellectual property licensing policy and significant 
opportunities for free-riding, one could argue that traditional open innovation 
mechanisms for appropriating value from purposive outflows of knowledge should have 
been limited in their effectiveness.  Beyond providing one of the few large-scale, 
empirical validations of open innovation concepts, this work explores two additional 
mechanisms affecting appropriation under conditions of weak appropriability in settings 
such as multipartner alliances.  First, alignment is the intentional effort to influence the 
activities of the multipartner alliance to align with those of the firm.  Second, absorption 
is the process of learning collaboratively generated knowledge and using it within the 
firm to move a firm’s direction, resources, and capabilities closer to those of the alliance.  
These alternative mechanisms, which may be particularly effective in weak 
appropriability regimes, may be used in network settings such as multipartner alliances to 
affect a firm’s appropriation of benefits from participation.   
 Not only does this contribute to emerging open innovation empirical work, but 
may also provide theoretical and empirical complements for Lavie’s (2006) extension of 
the RBV that identifies appropriation conditions of relational rent (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
These conditions include a firm’s relative absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990), relative scale and scope of resources (Dyer & Singh, 1998), contractual agreement 
and opportunistic behaviors (Williamson, 1985), and relative bargaining power (Hamel, 
 
 65
1991).  Accounting for some of these appropriation conditions, this paper goes beyond 
the relative scale and scope of resources owned by a participant and examines the scale 
(and partially the scope) of purposive outflows of knowledge resources contributed to the 
collective and how this might affect firm innovation productivity. 
 In conclusion, the goal of this chapter was to explore the impact of a firm’s level 
of membership and contribution to multipartner alliances on its innovation productivity 
and the potential mechanisms driving that relationship.  I found that higher levels of 
membership and increased levels of contribution are positively related to a firm’s 
innovation productivity.  Multiple measures of contribution including the number of 
unique contributing employees (breadth), the number of unique specifications contributed 
to (depth), and the total number of author-specification independently demonstrated the 
positive relationship.  Due to the nature of knowledge and weak appropriability regime 
within the Bluetooth SIG, mechanisms of alignment and absorption were introduced to 
complement traditional open innovation mechanisms of IP rights and complementary 
assets to influence appropriation of benefits.  Both alignment and absorption are 
primarily endogenous mechanisms and were found to be influential. 
 There are several limitations of this study.  First, with empirical results from a 
single multipartner alliance, greater understanding of innovation patterns will come from 
studying other alliances.  In particular, alignment and absorption have been highlighted as 
mechanisms of value within multipartner alliances with weak appropriability rights, 
primarily from royalty-free licensing.  Considering much standard-setting and some open 
innovation research use settings with a tighter appropriability regime (including GSM 
mobile phone technology, some IETF internet technologies, and many of the standards 
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from IEEE, ISO, and ANSI) with meaningful IP protection for contributors, this opens a 
new door for additional research in standard-setting multipartner alliances and coalitions 
operating primarily under royalty-free licensing policies.  A second limitation of this 
study is in disentangling and isolating the mechanisms advanced in this chapter.  Depth, 
breadth, and total contributions are highly correlated (depth and breadth are subsets of 
total contribution) with each other and while breadth and depth have been argued to 
represent distinct mechanisms of absorption and alignment respectively, are not separable 
within the Bluetooth context.  A third limitation (and strength) is in using the Bluetooth 
SIG as a context of interest.  With a significant majority of the product-qualifying firms 
headquartered internationally and privately held, greater precision in and breadth of 
control variables are simply limited by the availability of data.  This is in spite of 
extensive database and internet searches, more than a hundred emailed inquiries, and 
tremendous assistance from the Bluetooth SIG.  This is also considered a strength due to 
the size and truly international nature of the Bluetooth SIG membership.  Fourth, with the 
measure of contribution related to authoring, neither the value nor the extent of a 
contribution is captured.  Increased insight into the actual contribution could lead to 
greater understanding of the mechanisms of alignment and absorption. 
Considering the still-early stage development of open innovation within 
collaborative settings such as multipartner alliance, as noted earlier, future research in 
this area will benefit from understanding how and when certain mechanisms of 
appropriation may be used to affect the appropriation patterns for firms.  Firms 
participating in standard setting organizations with a relatively strong appropriability 




the firm while still gaining economic benefits (through royalty pools) from the purposive 
outflows of knowledge.  As will be explored in Chapter 4, early use of purposive 






CONTRIBUTION TIMING AND FIRM SIZE 
 Considering the entry timing, value chain positioning, and contribution strategies 
explored in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter adds two new variables of interest to the 
overarching topic of firm strategies within multipartner alliances that may influence firm 
innovation productivity.  The first examines the assertion of a collaborative phase and a 
competitive phase within the ongoing life cycle of multipartner alliances and how active 
contribution within each period may influence a firm’s innovation performance.  I assert 
that firms enjoy certain advantages through early-stage or collaborative-stage 
participation that may lead to enhanced firm innovation productivity. Traditional early-
mover advantages highlighted in Chapter 2 that are likely more meaningful for active 
contributors include the opportunity to influence technological specifications (see 
mechanism of alignment discussed in Chapter 3) and to initiate market direction.  Firms 
may find the social capital and network positioning gained through making early 
contributions to the alliance particularly valuable when tangible market performance is 
not yet available and market leaders are determined through less tangible means such as 
awareness and perceived influence (Ahuja, 2000; Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006).   The 
second variable of interest explores the impact of firm size by contributing firms.  Small 
firms that may be deficient in traditional sources of competitive advantage may use the 
fertile ground of a multipartner alliance to develop “collaborative advantage” that may 
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lead to enhanced innovation performance as compared to larger firms (Almeida, Dokko, 
& Rosenkopf, 2002).   
This work continues to use the Bluetooth SIG setting for empirical testing.  
Considering the more collaborative nature1 and the weak appropriability regime of the 
Bluetooth SIG, this part of the study may provide valuable insight into timing of 
contribution.  Additionally, this complements research by Waguespack and Fleming 
(2009) who explored how different forms of contribution by new ventures to the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) may improve a startup’s chances of a liquidity event by 
evaluating the effects of contribution on an alternative dependent variable, innovation 
productivity.  Unlike the research of Waguespack and Fleming, I analyzed the small 
firm’s innovation productivity compared to large firms, and I expected that large firms 
would have greater innovation productivity, but increased levels of contribution by small 
firms would enable them to close the gap with similarly contributing large firms.   
Empirical results do not show significant differences in innovation productivity 
related to timing of contribution.  As expected, small firms are disadvantaged by their 
size but unexpectedly do not make up ground lost to larger competitors through increased 
levels of contribution.  Exploring further, I then discovered that small firms contributing 
primarily during the collaborative phase experienced an innovation productivity 
disadvantage. This leads to a discussion of relational rent appropriation and the 
                                                 
1 From interviews of lifetime participants in the Bluetooth SIG, many of the people interviewed have also 
worked in standard setting organizations such as the IEEE, IETF, ISO, and GSM.  Universally, participants 
involved in multiple standard-setting organizations describe the Bluetooth SIG as the most collaborative 
and constructive multifirm standardization body in which they have worked. 
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disadvantages small firms experience while managing the hazards of alliances and trying 
to leverage the mechanisms of appropriation discussed in Chapter 3. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Technology-focused multipartner alliances can be characterized by a dual 
innovation process.  Consistent with the open innovation research agenda advanced by 
West, Vanhaverbeke, and Chesbrough (2006), members are focused on a dual investment 
in both the collaborative efforts of the alliance such as specification development, brand 
marketing, and technology validation, and the internal firm development of technology 
and complementary assets.  As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, this dual 
innovation process leads to an interesting competitive/collaborative dynamic that may 
influence the previously analyzed relationships between alliance entry timing, level of 
involvement, and firm innovation productivity by extending additional benefits to firms 
that actively contribute during collaborative stage developments of the core technologies.   
In Teece’s (1986) discussion on appropriability regimes, he highlights two stages 
in the evolutionary development of technology.  The first is a preparadigmatic stage when 
product designs are fluid and when there is no “generally accepted conceptual treatment 
of the phenomenon” (Teece, 1986:287).   Competition tends to be less focused on profits 
and more on achieving a dominant design, an activity primarily driven by market forces 
in Teece’s preparadigmatic stage.  The second stage reflects the competitive phase when 
a dominant design emerges.  In this phase, firms manage costs, leverage complementary 
assets, and enhance operational capabilities to compete.   
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 The early-stage activity of a multipartner alliance is similar to a coordinated pre-
paradigmatic phase of seeking a dominant design.  Relying less on traditional sources of 
competitive advantage for positioning and more on sources of what could be called 
“collaborative advantage” such as flexibility, network positioning, and willingness to 
support knowledge mobility (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Laursen & Salter, 2006; 
Schilling & Phelps, 2007), firms may invest heavily in the collaborative innovation 
efforts of the alliance while positioning for firm-level innovation activity.  During this 
early phase, high-impact decisions regarding architecture, interfaces, applications, and 
interoperability are being made, which may lead to opportunities for a firm to align the 
direction of the alliance with firm-level innovation.  Even as a multipartner alliance 
transitions to a more paradigmatic or competitive phase, evolutionary activities of the 
alliance may provide numerous opportunities to contribute and influence the alliance; 
however, these contributions will likely have less impact than early-phase contributions.    
Liabilities of smallness or newness (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983) suggest 
that large firms simply have superior resources, more reliable organizational structures, 
greater absorptive capacity, and more mature processes to compete than small firms 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Deeds, 2001).  However, considering the collaborative 
processes and structure of multipartner alliances that may favor collaborative advantage, 
opportunities may exist for small firms to thrive through active contribution.  Recent 
research by Waguespack and Fleming (2009) explored the relationship between new 
venture participation strategies in multipartner alliances that focus on standard-setting 
and the likelihood of a subsequent liquidity event.  While I use innovation productivity as 
a dependent variable, Waguespack and Fleming provide a solid departure point in that 
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they empirically examined multiple measures of new venture participation including 
authorship, attempt to author, attendance, and leadership and found that attendance was 
the only measure of participation that enhanced the likelihood of a liquidity event.  
Adopting the participation measure of authorship, I am particularly interested in 
innovation productivity differences between small and large firms and how the 
differences may be affected by increases in authored contributions to the alliance. 
 Firms actively engaged in the collaborative phase are likely to experience many of 
the early-entry advantages described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  These include the 
opportunity to define technology, set the starting point of the market, and initiate the 
learning curve (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998).  Beyond these early-mover 
benefits, actively contributing firms may improve network position within the social 
structure of the multipartner alliance to the alliance (Hallen, 2008), and through 
previously discussed mechanisms of alignment and absorption, may have learning 
benefits (Almeida et al., 2002) and increased opportunity to absorb and exploit tacit 
knowledge (Zahra & George, 2002) to enhance innovation.  Combining early-mover 
benefits with benefits from active contribution, firms that actively contribute in the 
collaborative phase of multipartner alliances will likely generate collaborative advantage 
that enhances firm innovation productivity.   
 This is not to suggest that contribution during the competitive phase is without 
value to a firm’s innovation productivity.  With much market and technological risk 
removed, the alliance-adopted and market-accepted transition to the competitive phase 
provides opportunities to build from the core technologies defined and developed in the 
collaborative phase.  New applications and market expansion create evolutionary 
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opportunities for contribution and further innovation.  Reduced technological uncertainty 
may accelerate the development of new specifications for similar technologies.  
Fundamentally, multipartner alliances that successfully transition to the competitive 
phase may have a greater number of opportunities for contributing firms to influence the 
alliance.  However, many of these opportunities are incremental, explore niches, and have 
less impact than collaborative phase contributions that define the architecture, interfaces, 
and interoperability of the technology.  The higher-impact contributions of the 
collaborative phase should have greater influence on aligning the core technologies of the 
alliance with the capabilities of the contributing firm, and thus a firm’s innovation 
productivity.  I therefore hypothesize that firms contributing more during the 
collaborative phase will experience greater innovation productivity than firms that 
contribute primarily in the competitive phase of the alliance.    
H1 – Firms focused more on collaborative phase contribution than competitive 
phase contribution experience greater firm innovation productivity. 
 
 From Stinchcombe’s (1965) notion of liability of newness, which has also been 
extended to smallness (Freeman et al., 1983), deficits related to organizational 
immaturity, smaller resource pool, reduced absorptive capacity, and lack of legitimacy 
(Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) plague young, small ventures.  As was briefly 
highlighted in Chapter 3, firms choosing to engage in purposive outflows of knowledge 
may rely on complementary assets under the control of the firm (Chesbrough, 2009) to 
appropriate benefits from the contributions to the alliance.  Larger firms generally have 
greater access to these complementary assets than small firms, and thus, may use these 
complementary assets to increase innovation productivity. Therefore, based on long-
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standing theories related to liabilities of smallness and appropriation mechanisms in open 
innovation, I hypothesize that actively contributing large firms will have greater firm 
innovation productivity than actively contributing small firms.  
H2 – Contributing large firms demonstrate greater firm innovation productivity 
than contributing small firms. 
  
 Zahra and George (2002) reconceptualized absorptive capacity as a dynamic 
capability of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation to gain 
and sustain competitive advantage.  They also highlighted various measures traditionally 
used to capture a firm’s absorptive capacity, which include: investment in technical 
training, R&D personnel, R&D intensity, and process effectiveness. Following absorptive 
capacity theory (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002), firms with smaller 
R&D functions and fewer personnel are likely to possess smaller absorptive capacity than 
firms with large R&D functions.  This increased absorptive capacity would suggest that 
as large firms, compared to equally contributing small firms, increase their level of 
participation and contribution in multipartner alliances, the difference in innovation 
productivity between large and small firms will likely increase.  However, there are 
certain assets of newness or smallness that may counteract this widening gap.  These 
assets include the ability to overcome major management challenges of adaptation that 
may exist due to the lack of core rigidities and path dependence that large firms may 
experience (Leonard-Barton, 1992), possible learning advantages in new areas, and 
organizational flexibility (Choi & Shepherd, 2005).  These assets of newness align with 
sources of collaborative advantage described earlier suggesting that firms contributing to 
multipartner alliances may leverage assets of newness to enhance success within the 
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activities of the multipartner alliance which lead to increased innovation productivity.  
The question of interest is if this increased innovation attributed to assets of newness and 
smallness by small firms is greater than the increases experienced by larger firms.  
Considering the need for flexibility, adaptation, and rapid learning in multipartner 
alliances focused on collaborative innovation and possible conditions of inertia and path 
dependence experienced by larger, more established firms, I hypothesize that while 
innovation productivity will likely increase for both firms as contribution increases, the 
innovation productivity gap between large and small firms will shrink with increased 
contribution. 
H3 – Small firms demonstrate greater increases in firm innovation productivity 
from increased contribution than large firms. 
 
Data and Methods 
 The setting for this analysis is once again the Bluetooth SIG, a multipartner 
alliance that has enjoyed contributions from a broad and diverse set of members since its 
inception in the late 1990s.  I learned through interviews with members of some of the 
founding Promoter firms that the original vision was to keep all development work the 
responsibility of the Promoter firms.  Founding Promoters presumed they would have the 
bandwidth and knowledge to complete the specifications of the short-range wireless 
technology.  Additionally, by retaining manufacturing responsibilities of the technology, 
it was assumed these firms would then have exclusive claim on the rents generated from 
this technology.  This was particularly interesting considering the royalty-free intellectual 
property agreement these promoter firms had signed, indicating that unlike many 
communication technologies developed by multipartner alliances at the time (e.g., GSM), 
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there would be no royalty pool and patents attributed to this technology would be freely 
available to members. 
 Not long after alliance inception, the board members (represented by Promoters) 
elected to open the membership to other firms and provided opportunity for committee 
membership as long as firms were willing to sign the intellectual property rights 
agreement.  Membership grew very quickly and a set of specifications that once was 
controlled by just a few firms now had hundreds of people from more than one hundred 
firms actively contributing to their creation.  Some commercial acceptance of Bluetooth 
version 1.1 began with 52 million integrated circuits shipped in 2003,2 but with the 
updates to version 1.2 of the core specification released in November of 2003, volumes of 
product based on the Bluetooth standard grew rapidly (see Figure 4.1)  
  




























Bluetooth IC Units Shipped
 
Figure 4.1.   Bluetooth growth in number of units shipped by year2  
                                                 
2 Source: IMS Research, 2008 
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 As highlighted by the 2004 knee in Bluetooth adoption growth, I posit that the 
release of Version 1.2 of the core Bluetooth specification indicates a transition from more 
focus on collaboration to one of competition as meaningful network externalities and 
customer adoption were achieved.  Evidence from multiple interviews with individual 
participants involved since the beginning support this assertion. One individual 
participating from an Associate member firm said, “My impression is that it was much 
more open in the beginning and tightened when there was meaningful competition 
happening.”  Therefore, to assess potential differences in innovation productivity for 
firms actively contributing to the alliance, I separated the contributions made up to and 
including Version 1.2 of the core specification (the collaborative phase) with those 
contributions made after this (competitive phase). 
 In total, 553 people from 106 firms actively contributed to over 100 specifications 
developed by committees within the SIG.  There were 285 unique authors from 54 firms 
who contributed in the collaborative phase, 369 unique authors from 82 firms who 
contributed to specifications developed during the competitive phase, and 101 authors 
from 30 firms who contributed to specifications in both phases.  Of the total author 
contributions, 634 were coded for specifications in the collaborative phase and 1380 were 
coded in the competitive phase.   
 This study also analyzes the innovation performance of small firms.  Of the 106 
firms that contributed to the specifications of the Bluetooth SIG, 47 were coded as small 
firms as determined by an assessment of available data including a combination of 
quantitative (revenue and employee count) and qualitative data.  Considering the diverse 
nature of the contributing members of the Bluetooth SIG and the decade of continuous 
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standards development, this is an excellent setting for analyzing how the phase of a 
multipartner alliance and the size of the contributing firm may influence the relationship 
between active contribution to the alliance and subsequent firm innovation performance. 
 
Measures 
Dependent variable.  Again, the dependent variable (Innovation Productivity) is 
measured as the number of new products qualified to a Bluetooth standard by a firm.  All 
106 firms are coded (including 32 firms that qualified no products) with the total number 
of products qualified to the Bluetooth SIG requirements through May 2010.  To account 
for varying lengths of membership by contributing firms, I measured the number of 
qualified products per year of membership by including a variable offset in the mode.  
Independent variables.  From Chapter 3, I continue to use Total_Contribution to 
capture a firm’s contribution to the alliance technology.  This measure is the cumulative 
total of all author-specifications contributed by a firm.  An author-specification 
references each time a firm’s employee is listed as an author of one specification.  
Authorship is granted when a working committee leadership determines a contribution 
was significant.  No specific standard for granting authorship was established by the 
governing board of the Bluetooth SIG leaving much discretion to committee leadership.  
A firm can contribute multiple authors to the same specification and a single author can 
contribute to multiple specifications.  Author-specifications ranged from one to 293 with 
a mean of 19 author-specification contributions per firm.  To improve interpretability of 
interactions, Total_Contributions was mean-centered.    
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To explore the impact of firm size and phase of contribution, two dichotomous 
variables were created.  Firm size was a difficult variable to determine due to the majority 
of firms in the sample being privately held and internationally headquartered.   Using 
public records, email interviews, company websites, and press releases, best efforts were 
made to determine traditional measures of firm size such as revenue and employee count.  
With incomplete data, a qualitative, dichotomous variable of Small_Firm was coded a 
“1” for those firms determined to have less than approximately $300M USD in 2009 
revenues and/or less than 1,000 employees.  The variable was coded a “0” otherwise.  
Collaborator identifies those firms that made a greater contribution during the 
collaborative phase as compared to the competitive phase.  This was determined by 
comparing the ratio of a firm’s author-specification collaborative-phase contributions to 
all the contributions during the collaborative phase (634) and separately the ratio of a 
firm’s author-specification competitive-phase contributions to all the contributions during 
the competitive phase (1380).  If the ratio was greater during the collaborative phase, the 
firm was coded a “1”, otherwise “0”. 
Control variables. To account for potential survival issues, failed (Failed Firm) or 
acquired firms (Acquired firms) that may reflect an earlier-than-expected end to 
innovation productivity, two dichotomous measures are included to capture effects 
related to these exits (coded “1” if failed or acquired, a “0” otherwise).  Considering that 
only alliance members with either Promoter membership or Associate membership are 
entitled to contribute to the specification development process, I draw distinction between 
these two levels of membership with dichotomous measure Promoter to capture effects 
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related to membership level.  Membership duration is captured as an offset variable in the 
dependent variable.     
 
Method 
 Consistent with the models developed in Chapters 2 and 3, I continue to use 
hierarchical negative binomial regression with a log link to account for overdispersion in 
the count-based dependent variable.  Interactions between the independent variables 
enable evaluation and interpretation of changes in slopes to test the effects in Hypotheses 
1 and 3.  Results were supplemented by an independent samples T-test for Hypothesis 1 
to compare innovation productivity means between firms that contributed more in the 
collaborative phase and firms that contributed more in the competitive phase.  
Descriptive statistics are available in Table 4.1.  Scatterplots of moderated contribution 
versus innovation productivity relationships are included in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
Table 4.1.  Descriptive statistics 
 
N Mean STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Innovation Productivity 106 22.27 43.03 1.000
2. Promoter 106 0.076 0.265 0.244 1.000
3. Acquired 106 0.150 0.36 -0.250 -0.120 1.000
4. Failed 106 0.030 0.167 -0.157 -0.049 0.087 1.000
5. Collaborator 106 0.406 0.493 -0.056 0.200 0.081 0.207 1.000
6. Total_Contributiona 106 0.000 41.3 0.471 0.426 0.026 -0.007 0.019 1.000
7. Small_Firm 106 0.44 0.50 -0.472 -0.255 0.207 0.191 0.036 -0.408 1.000
Table 1 reports the number of observations, means and standard deviations of the 
  study’s variables as well as the Spearman's correlation matrix.   
Correlation coefficients larger than 0.190 in absolute value were significant at the 5% level.















 Hypothesis 1 explored the differences in innovation productivity that a firm may 
realize by focusing more on collaborative phase contributions than competitive phase 
contributions. As noted above, Hypothesis 1 was evaluated using multiple methods.  
Results of an independent samples T-test comparing innovation productivity means 
between firm’s focused on collaborative phase contribution and competitive phase 
contribution were not significant.  From Table 4.2, the variable Collaborator is not 
significant to the 5% level in any of the models developed for this study (coefficients for 
the Collaborator variable are significant to the 10% level in Models 3 and 4).  
Additionally, examining potential slope differences as levels of contribution change, the 
interaction between Total_Contribution and Collaborator is not significant in any of the 
models while Total_Contribution remains significant and positive (suggesting as was 
analyzed in Chapter 3 that there is a significant relationship between increased levels of 
contribution and greater firm innovation productivity).  Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
 For Hypothesis 2, I analyzed the impact of firm size on innovation productivity 
with the expectation that smaller firms experience reduced innovation productivity as 
compared to larger firms.  Model 3 highlights the significant and negative impact small 
size has on a firm’s innovation productivity as demonstrated in the variable Small_Firm 
( 001.,353.1 <−= p )β  suggesting support for Hypothesis 2. 
 For Hypothesis 3, I evaluated if increased levels of contribution by small firms 
may close the gap identified in Hypothesis 2.  Analyzing the sign and significance of the 
interaction between Total_Contribution and Small_Firm in model 4, not only is the 
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–Table 4.2.   Regression results – timing of contribution and firm size 
 
Model Model Model Model Model
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept -4.762*** -4.779*** -4.359*** -4.355*** -4,573***
(0.233) (0.230) (0.266) (0.266) (0.258)
Promoter -0.249 -0.973 -0.752 -0.671 -0.737
(0.798) (1.089) (0.999) (0.982) (0.995)
Acquired -1.766*** -1.697*** -1.158* -1.139* -1.065*
(0.496) (0.502) (0.483) (0.482) (0.479)
Failed -2.778* -2.700* -1.652 -1.723 -1.138
(1.262) (1.254) (1.204) (1.203) (1.202)
Collaborator -0.454 -0.364 -0.611† -0.627† -0.081
(0.363) (0.376) (0.356) (0.353) (0.447)
Total_Contributiona 0.020** 0.017** 0.010† 0.010† 0.012*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Total_Contribution x Collaborator 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Small_Firm -1.353*** -0.247 0.275
(0.358) (1.130) (1.157)
Total_Contribution x Small_Firm 0.077 0.080
(0.072) (0.072)
Small_Firm x Collaborator -1.449*
(0.706)
Dispersion Parameter 2.66* 2.63* 2.29* 2.26* 2.16*
N 106 106 106 106 106
Log Likelihood -365.3 -364.7 -358.4 -357.8 -355.7
df 99 98 97 96 95
2x Delta Log Likelihood from Model 1 1.2 13.8*** 15.0*** 19.2***
2x Delta Log Likelihood from prior model 12.6*** 1.2 4.2*
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Significance levels (2-tailed):  † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001 




 interaction not significant, but the independent variable Small_Firm is no longer 
significant.  Hypothesis 3 is not supported.   
 To explore the relationship between contribution timing and firm size one step 
further, I examined the interaction of the dichotomous independent variables Small_Firm 
and Collaborator in Model 5 to determine if small firms may improve their innovation 
productivity by focusing their contribution during the collaborative phase.  In the absence 
of many sources of competitive advantage and with more dependence on sources of 
collaborative advantage, resource deficient small firms that actively contribute to the 
alliance may thrive in an environment where future competitive positioning may be 
dependent on this early-stage collaborative positioning (Agarwal et al., 2007; Gilbert et 
al., 2008). Unfortunately for small firms, this interaction is significant and negative 
( 05.,521.1 <−= p )β .  This unexpected result suggests that participation during the 
collaborative period by small firms is negatively related to innovation productivity and 
will be discussed in greater detail below.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) outlined potential early mover advantages 
including the opportunity to create technological leadership.  Within multipartner 
alliances, firms often choose to actively contribute to the development of technology 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006) with the intent of creating this leadership suggested by 
Lieberman and Montgomery.  Early, collaborative stage development of new 
technologies is a time when high-impact decisions regarding architecture, component 
interactions, and applications are being made.  Firms that contribute more intensely 
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during this phase should be more likely to achieve a level of technological leadership and 
alignment with the activities of the firm that translates to enhanced firm innovation 
productivity.  However, the results of empirical testing in the Bluetooth SIG suggest there 
is no significant difference in a firm’s innovation productivity related to its timing of 
contribution.  This result questions contribution as a possible driver of early mover 
advantages through technological leadership.   
 The supported results for Hypothesis 2 indicate that small firms are at an 
innovation productivity disadvantage when compared to large firms.  This is consistent 
with a wide range of management theories.  Hypothesis 3 suggested that while both small 
and large firms should enjoy increased innovation productivity from increased 
contribution, the difference should shrink with increased contribution (although 
absorptive capacity theory would suggest a widening gap).  This was hypothesized due to 
the flexibility, adaptability, and ease of learning advantages often attributed to small 
firms (Choi & Shepherd, 2005).  The insignificant outcome failed to highlight advantages 
or disadvantages to increasing contributions by small firms when compared to large 
firms.  These results highlight an appropriation concern of the originally conceived 
concept of relational rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998) in that rents tend to accrue to the larger 
firm.  Recent conceptual work on the appropriation of relational rents (Dyer et al., 2008; 
Lavie, 2006) favors those with traditional sources of competitive advantage including 
unique resources and (dynamic) capabilities, large absorptive capacity, careful spillover 
management, and the ability to carefully manage alliance hazards – typical attributes of 
larger firms.  This study empirically contributes validation of this conceptual work. 
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 The exploratory analysis beyond Hypothesis 3 adds interesting insight into how 
firm size and timing of contribution together influence a firm’s innovation productivity.  
Small firms engaged in collaborative-phase contribution experience a negative impact to 
their own innovation productivity.  This may be attributed to the small firm’s inability to 
leverage the mechanisms of alignment and absorption to exploit its own purposive 
outflows of knowledge.  In the absence of intellectual property rights, complementary 
assets, alignment, and absorption, these outflows of knowledge lose purpose and simply 
become spillovers available to other alliance members where larger firms are better 
equipped to absorb and use these spillovers. 
 Beyond limitations related to working with data from a single multipartner 
alliance, several limitations exist with this study.  First, availability of fine-grained data 
related to firm size among many of the privately held and internationally headquartered 
firms limit a more refined understanding of how firm size may be related to innovation 
productivity.  In particular, new ventures with few employees and limited resources may 
view alliance participation as an opportunity to increase legitimacy and enhance 
partnering opportunities (Rosenkopf et al., 2001) while much larger, well-established 
firms that push the upper limits of what has been defined in this paper as a small firm 
may have very different objectives and innovation productivity from participation. 
 Second, while an argument has been suggested that collaborative phase 
contributions may be more systemic with higher impact to the core technology, little 
evidence has been presented.  While data are currently unavailable, a qualitative impact 
assessment of the specifications by subject-matter experts may increase understanding of 
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when impactful contributions are made and how firms may use these contributions to 
align the interests of the alliance with those of the firm. 
 A third limitation, particularly in the evaluation of small firm performance, is 
related to possible reduction in the time from contribution to value capture as technology 
and alliance processes mature.  In the Bluetooth example, early contributions to the 
standard may require several years to mature and receive committee, alliance, and market 
acceptance, while evolutionary changes to proven technology may require only months 
from contribution to acceptance.  As highlighted in multiple interviews, small firms may 
not have the financial resources or the managerial staying power to endure.  This 
shrinking window is not empirically validated and may contribute to the reduced 
innovation productivity for contributing small firms. 
 While the results of this study did not bode well for small firms compared to large 
firms participating in multipartner alliances, this does not stop many firms (literally 
thousands within the Bluetooth SIG) from initiating significant strategic action in support 
of the technologies of these alliances.  Future research should explore other dimensions 
of the small venture question including the benefits that accrue to small firms that 
contribute compared to small firms that do not.  Additionally, the opportunities provided 
to small firms by the multipartner alliance may be superior when compared to small firms 
innovating on their own.   While early contributions had a negative impact on innovation 
productivity, incremental contributions during the competitive phase may represent a 
solid strategy for new firms to appropriate value from membership.   
 Small ventures continue to flock to technology-focused multipartner alliances 




endogenously influence the alliance for their own benefit is a door that is only opened by 





This dissertation explored the question of appropriation of benefits from 
collaborative innovation within multipartner alliances.  Assumptions of homogeneity in 
the availability of benefits and exogeneity in the mechanisms that determine distribution 
of those benefits have been replaced with assumptions of heterogeneity and endogeneity 
– at least to a degree. Thus, to Teece’s 1986 question of who profits from innovation and 
who does not, I have simply expanded to collaborative innovation, measured a firm’s 
innovation productivity as one benefit from collaborative innovation, and entered this 
study assuming endogeneity and homogeneity.  Through empirical testing of the 
relationship between a firm’s innovation productivity and its various strategic choices as 
it relates to participation in the Bluetooth SIG, I have uncovered both heterogeneity in 
available benefits and endogeneity in appropriation influences. 
In Chapter 2, I explored the relationship between innovation productivity and 
timing of entry moderated by value chain position.  While I confirmed prior findings by 
Lavie et al. (2007) of a U-shaped relationship in the aggregate, I also demonstrated the 
impact of value chain position on the model.  End product suppliers represented the only 
link in the value chain that exhibited the U-shaped relationship and those firms focused 
on standard products had an inverse U-shaped relationship between innovation 
productivity and timing of entry, suggesting that it may be better to be an intermediate 
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entrant if a firm chooses to focus on standard products.  Beyond the contribution of value 
chain position to the previously published relationship between entry timing and 
innovation productivity, this chapter highlighted a key outcome difference between firms 
focused on standard and complementary products as firms focused on complementary 
products enjoyed both early and late entry innovation productivity advantages while 
standard product firms did not. 
 In Chapter 3, I examined the impact of a firm’s level of membership and 
contribution to multipartner alliances on its innovation productivity and describe potential 
mechanisms driving that relationship.  I found that higher levels of membership and 
increased levels of contribution are positively related to a firm’s innovation productivity.  
Multiple measures of contribution including the number of unique contributing 
employees (breadth), the number of unique specifications contributed to (depth), and the 
total number of author-specification showed a positive relationship between contribution 
and a firm’s innovation productivity.  Due to the nature of knowledge and weak 
appropriability regime within the Bluetooth SIG, I introduced mechanisms of alignment 
and absorption to complement traditional open innovation mechanisms of IP rights and 
complementary assets that influence appropriation of benefits.  Both alignment and 
absorption are primarily endogenous mechanisms and were found to be influential. 
 In Chapter 4, I researched how the timing of contribution and size of firm 
moderated the relationship between a firm’s contribution and its innovation productivity.  
The innovation productivity of firms that contributed primarily during the collaborative 
phase showed no significant difference from firms that primarily contributed during the 
competitive phase.  While large firms have higher innovation productivity than small 
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firms, the interaction that tested for a greater increase in innovation productivity for 
equally contributing small firms (as compared to large firms) was not significant.  
Combining the effects of the two moderating variables, small firms that contributed 
during the collaborative phase experienced a negative impact to their innovation 
productivity suggesting that small firms may be less able to leverage the mechanisms of 
appropriation discussed and developed in this dissertation.  
 
Future work 
 Looking forward, there are numerous avenues I can pursue to strengthen strategic 
management research of firm performance in multipartner alliances.  Additionally, the 
Bluetooth dataset used in this dissertation is unique and still relatively untapped.   The 
following discussion introduces new variables, methods, and angles to enhance our 
understanding of how firm’s may appropriate value from their activities related to 
multipartner alliances. 
 New dependent variables.  While the dependent variable used throughout this 
work was focused on a firm’s own innovation productivity, I have not addressed the 
economic value of participation for the firm.  As noted in Chapter 3, the link between 
innovation productivity and a firm’s appropriation of rent needs strengthening.  Future 
work can strengthen this link through examination of technology-specific revenues and 
market share position.  Industry analysts track these details in many of the large-scale 
technology-focused alliances like Bluetooth and sell reports that detail the performance 
of top firms, often by product offering.   Obtaining and using these reports could not only 
provide a correlative assessment between innovation productivity and economic 
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performance, but could also be used in a longitudinal study to examine how firm 
participation varies over time since many of these reports (including those written for 
Bluetooth technology) are updated annually.  These data coupled with longitudinal 
analysis assessing contribution and new product data could provide greater insight into 
the value of isolated or sustained participation in the alliance. 
 Considering the entrepreneurial characteristics of many Bluetooth firms, a second 
dependent variable of interest could be tied to firm mortality, change of ownership, or 
liquidity events consistent with work by Waguespack and Fleming (2009).  Beyond these 
formal strategies for exit, understanding exits and the discontinuation of both 
collaboration within the alliance and internal product development activity could shed 
light on why some firm’s were unable to appropriate value from both collaborative and 
firm innovation. 
 Understanding how different factors influence a firm’s level of innovativeness 
suggests a third dependent variable, which may act as a mediating variable to firm 
performance.  Qualitative measures of firm innovativeness that captures how 
revolutionary, how explorative, how different, how usable, how needed both a firm’s 
contribution to the multipartner alliance and a firm’s own product offering are could 
provide further insight into the question of balancing exploration and exploitation (Lavie 
& Rosenkopf, 2006; March, 1991; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001), particularly as it relates 
to participation in technology-focused multipartner alliances. 
 New independent variables.  In Chapter 2, I examined the impact of value chain 
position on the relationship between entry timing and innovation productivity.  This 
moderating variable could be viewed as an initial attempt to capture modularity effects 
 
 93
(Langlois, 2002; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) related to both the technology and 
organizational structure of the alliance.  Considering the value network approach 
described in Chapter 3, greater insight into how modularity affects the initial 
standardization process and interdependencies between designs and committees may lead 
to greater understanding of collaboration between competing firms.  Exploring changes in 
modularity, particularly how modular aggregation affects technological and 
organizational processes as the alliance matures, could provide insight into how some 
firms may capitalize on previously unidentified niches within the original value network.  
These independent variables may include measures of system integration, complexity, 
and temporal precedence (the need to define or develop a core technology before 
ancillary technologies can start).  
While the strong international influence in the Bluetooth SIG limited data 
collection for more refined measures, independent variables related to the location of a 
firm’s headquarters, the nationality of contributing authors, and the strength or formality 
of a nation’s contract law could provide greater insight into international influences on 
appropriating value from open and collaborative innovation, particularly in light of the 
weak appropriability regime of the Bluetooth SIG.  This research would benefit from the 
use of longitudinal data analysis to capture changes in active, passive, and product-
qualifying membership over time.  These changes could reflect how appropriation 
patterns change by geography as the technology and alliance mature.  
 New methods.  This dissertation relied on cross-sectional analysis as measured at 
a particular point in time.  Multipartner alliances like the Bluetooth SIG and the member 
firms that form them experience significant change over time as they invent, standardize, 
 
 94
innovate, develop, and market products developed through collaboratively defined 
technology.  This evolution can be better understood through longitudinal or multiple 
cross-sectional analyses by examining firm-level participation strategies and subsequent 
performance at different points in time.  Some firms may not have the formal objective of 
maximizing economic return from products or services directly related to the alliance 
technology.  For example, in an interview with a long-time Bluetooth participant at Intel, 
it was suggested that Intel never intended to sell Bluetooth products.  They simply 
recognized that this wireless technology could enable greater demand for their 
microprocessors. This, and not market share or new product development, was the driver 
behind their substantial early investment in Bluetooth technology.  Using longitudinal 
analysis could provide greater insight into those firms that have different participation 
objectives. 
 A small number of new ventures such as Cambridge Silicon Radio, Bluegiga, 
Ezurio, ConnectBlue, Stonestreet One and others experienced significant market success 
in Bluetooth technology.  These firms were expressly formed to advance a Bluetooth 
technology business plan that also included active contributions to the standardization 
efforts.  A qualitative exploratory analysis using a multiple case study approach could 
determine any commonalities in how these firms found success from their participation 
while many did not.  My objective in pursuing this study would be to identify variables to 
be used in a larger-scale empirical test to isolate mechanisms used by successful new 
ventures participating in multipartner alliances.   
 External validity.  Many studies examining firm benefits from participation in 
consortia, multipartner alliances, and standard-setting organizations (see Simcoe (2006) 
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for an  exception) test hypotheses relying on a single multifirm organization.  To improve 
external validity of many of the concepts raised in this dissertation, Dovev Lavie and I 
are in the early stages of a project that will combine data from multiple multipartner 
alliances to gain improved external validity and greater insight into these questions of 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. 
 Governance strain.  In multiple interviews with members of the Bluetooth SIG 
professional management team and participating members (including board members), I 
identified an emerging concern that the SIG has outgrown its original edgy, innovative, 
and to an extent, collaborative personality.  Some suggest a potential strain between some 
board member firms that are primarily in harvest mode and member firms desiring 
continued innovation.  Some suggest that the very processes and infrastructure that the 
SIG worked so hard to develop are hindering further exploration to the point that member 
firms are taking their innovations that would normally fit within the collaborative 
activities of the Bluetooth SIG to other multipartner alliances.  Finally, nonboard member 
firms that have experienced substantial market success in Bluetooth technology express 
frustration that their voice is lost in SIG matters as uninterested (and less successful) 
board members steer the SIG in directions that are less beneficial to market leading 
nonboard member firms.  These frustrations point to a strain in alliance governance as the 
alliance matures and patterns of appropriation shift over time.  Research in this area could 
explore how large multipartner alliances can balance exploration and exploitation to meet 
the needs of competing members and optimum governance strategies for achieving them.  
 Firm choices influence appropriation of rents from collaborative innovation – 




I have demonstrated how multiple strategic choices and actions influence both 
collaborative innovation and a firm’s own innovation productivity.  I have suggested two 
primarily endogenously driven mechanisms – alignment and absorption – that may aid in 
determining open innovation appropriation patterns within multipartner alliances, 
particularly alliances working with weak appropriability regimes.  I add discouraging 
findings to the world of entrepreneurship and SME research in that not only does an 
innovation productivity gap exist between small and large firms contributing to 
multipartner alliances, it persists with increased levels of contribution.  Unfortunately for 
the small firm, contribution during the collaborative phase may actually harm the firm’s 
innovation productivity.  Lastly, in this and other chapters, I provided numerous paths for 
future research to enhance our understanding of collaborative and open innovation within 
multipartner alliances. 
 I have learned much about heterogeneity, endogeneity, multipartner alliances, 
open innovation, the Bluetooth SIG, and many other concepts and theories discussed in 
this dissertation.  Beyond these topics, I have learned much more about myself working 
through the process including humility, persistence, failure, initiative, discouragement, 
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